

## **How Demonstrative Pictorial Reference Grounds Contextualism**

In a very recent paper (forthcoming), Dominic McIver Lopes has claimed that pictures perceptually ground demonstrative reference to depicted objects. If as I think Lopes is right, this has important consequences for the debate on the semantics/pragmatics divide. For one can exploit Lopes' claim in order to provide one more argument in favour of the contextualist well-known thesis that wide context has not only both a pre- and a post-semantic role, but it also has a semantic role – to put it in Perry's (1997) terms.

According to Lopes, if when facing a picture of Madonna one utters:

(1) that's Madonna

she utters something true, insofar as by means of the above token of the demonstrative “that” she precisely refers to Madonna, the object depicted in that picture, and not to the picture itself. Moreover, that reference is genuinely demonstrative, in that not only one is directly referring to the depicted object – that is, the token of the demonstrative is not an abbreviation of a description like “the individual of which that is a picture” – but one is also directly referring to that object in a perceptively grounded way and not by means of a deferred ostension – as when one utters:

(2) this is parked out back

meaning by “this” her car yet ostending the car’s key.<sup>1</sup>

What Lopes claims seems to be entirely correct. First, it is clear that when one utters (1), her referent is the popsinger and not the popsinger’s picture she is confronting with. Granted, one could even refer to the picture itself by means of another token of the demonstrative, e.g. in the following token of:

(3) that is printed on Kodak paper.

But the picture is not what one refers to in (1), as the inappropriateness of the following co-predication shows:

(4) \*that’s Madonna and is printed on Kodak paper.

Moreover, that reference is demonstrative and not descriptive: there is no need to assume that the token of “that” in (1) abbreviates a definite description, for it is just an ordinary case of referential shift involving a directly referential term, as in the relevant tokens of:

(5) Madonna likes to listen to herself

(6) Madonna is on the top shelf

where the reflexive pronoun “herself” in (5) and the name “Madonna” in (6) are respectively used to refer to the works of the popsinger and to a particular copy of a CD of hers. To be sure, this is nowadays sufficiently established in the relevant literature.<sup>2</sup> Yet finally, Lopes quite reasonably adds that (1) is not a case of deferred ostension, such as (2). For while in cases like that shown by (2) there is no perceptual link between the utterer and the object she intends to refer to by means of the demonstrative – the car is completely out of the utterer’s sight, its key is the only relevant thing in view – as regards (1) a perceptual link between the utterer and the depicted object subsists, although it is an indirect link fixed via the direct perception of the picture – the object is seen in the picture.

As I said, Lopes maintains that the above utterance of (1) is true insofar as its token of “that” refers to Madonna, so that the utterance truthfully predicates of Madonna its self-identity (rather than falsely predicating of Madonna’s picture its identity with Madonna). Yet if this is the case, Lopes appears to be committed to a contextualist thesis according to which the wide context in which (1) is uttered has the *semantic* role of determining the truthconditions of that utterance, rather than having the mere *post-semantic* role of fixing what is implicated by that utterance, as traditionalists with respect to the semantics/pragmatics divide would say. Does the case in question really support such a contextualist view? In what follows, I will try to show that this is the case.

At first blush, one might think that, insofar as the above utterance of (1) displays

a referential shift of the very same general kind as that displayed by the above tokens of (5) and (6), this suffices to show that wide context plays a semantic role with respect to that utterance. For, as Recanati maintains, in all those cases there is no doubt that the truthconditions of the relevant utterance involve what is intuitively taken to be the referent of the token of the singular term involved and not the literal referent of that term (in our case, Madonna and not her picture); yet, as in (5)-(6), the narrow context of the above utterance of (1), i.e. in the determinate set of parameters that is intimately linked with that utterance,<sup>3</sup> plus the linguistic meaning of the demonstrative “that” (what Kaplan (1989 a,b) calls its character)<sup>4</sup> is unable to bring about that that utterance has such truthconditions.<sup>5</sup>

Yet, a traditionalist might reply, what such cases show is that wide context operates not at a semantic, but rather at a *pre-semantic* level in order to shift the relevant parameter of the narrow context that is intimately linked with that utterance. This makes the narrow context, so modified, a context of interpretation that, although it is no longer the context in which the utterance is uttered, still plays the normal semantic role of a narrow context. For it automatically determines the utterance’s truthconditions once the linguistic meaning of the uttered sentence is given. In this respect, there is no substantial difference between the above utterance of (1) and the following token of:

(7) I am not in

written by someone on behalf of the owner of a certain office on a post-it hung on that

office's door. Although the context of utterance of that token of (7) would have that "I" refers to the very someone that wrote that message – the person who is the agent in that context – pragmatic factors concerning the wide context of the utterance make it preliminarily the case that the narrow context relevant for the truthconditions of that token is not that context of utterance, but rather another context which has the office's owner rather than the real writer of the message as its agent parameter.<sup>6</sup> Once this pre-semantic contextual shift is performed, the modified narrow context automatically determines the truthconditions of that token, provided its linguistic meaning (particularly, the character of "I", namely what is expressed by (roughly) "the agent of the context") is given: that token of (7) is true iff the agent of the modified narrow context, i.e. the office's owner, is not in her office (at the relevant time).

Here is where what Lopes says enters the stage. Granted, the utterance of (1) involves a referential shift. Yet it involves no referential shift which relies on some well-established pragmatic factors somehow connecting the literal, or better customary,<sup>7</sup> referent of the token of "that" – Madonna's picture – with its intended or anyway intuitive referent, its extended referent – Madonna –, as precisely happens in all cases of deferred ostension; in (2), for example, there is a metonymical link between the literal referent of the token of "this" – the key – and its intended or anyway intuitive referent – the car which that key opens. For, as we have seen before, as regards the utterance of (1) it is not deferred ostension that matters, but rather perception: the intended or anyway intuitive referent of the token of "that" – Madonna – is seen in her picture by (1)'s utterer. Put in other terms, although a referential shift occurs with respect to the

token of “that” mobilized by the above utterance of (1), this does not depend on the fact that a metonymical link obtains between the customary referent (the picture) and the extended referent (Madonna) of that token, as is happens in the case of a deferred ostension, but rather on the fact that a perceptual experience works as a demonstration of the extended rather than of the customary referent of that token. In point of fact, although in some cases a causal link between the picture and its depicted obtain may obtain, in most cases no such link occurs, for instance whenever the depicted object has existed before that the picture has been generated. As a result, it would hard to say that in all such cases deferred ostension is what counts from the referential point of view (suppose e.g. that facing Raphael’s School of Athens I uttered:

(8) That is one of the greatest philosophers of all times

meaning Plato).

Insofar as this is the case, it may seem that an alternative and easy way for the contextualist to establish its conclusion is given. The singular term involved in (1)’s utterance, “that”, is a demonstrative taken in its majoritarian use, i.e. the perceptually-based use. As Kaplan (1989a,b) has shown, in this use a demonstrative works as an impure indexical. That is, it is not such that its character automatically fixes a referent for it in (narrow) context, as is the case with a pure indexical such as “I”: rather, something else is required, namely a demonstration, or better, the perception that lies behind the gesture in which the demonstration consists.<sup>8</sup> Now, a demonstration (or

better, the perception in question: from now, I will take this specification for granted) is precisely an element of wide context. So, wide context is required in order for an utterance containing a demonstrative taken in its majoritarian use to have determinate truthconditions, as contextualists maintain.<sup>9</sup>

As is well known, however, there are different ways for traditionalists to block this contextualist move in general – that is, for any normal perceptually-based use of a demonstrative, not only the specific perceptually-based use involving a pictorially indirect perceptual contact with the demonstrative’s intuitive referent. One can minimally broaden the narrow context by including in its set another parameter, i.e. the one involving demonstrations, or alternatively, the one involving the demonstrata themselves. Once this is done, everything works as with any other pure indexical: this minimally broadened narrow context automatically determines a referent for a demonstrative (hence, truthconditions for the sentential token involving that demonstrative), once the character of that demonstrative is given. No intervention of wide context is required any longer, for the pure indexicality of the demonstrative has been restored.<sup>10</sup>

Yet the interesting point is that this traditionalist reply is not enough. Let us go back to Lopes. As I said, in his paper Lopes not only maintains that the link between the use of a demonstrative and its depicted referent is basically perceptual, but also that this perceptual link is indirect: in using “that” while uttering (1), one sees Madonna in (seeing) her picture, hence through seeing Madonna’s picture directly. This means that in cases like this, at least when a subject is aware of facing a representational object, in

this case a picture qua picture of (and not as a mere coloured surface), this subject may entertain *two* different demonstrations: a direct demonstration, the one she would also have if she were completely unaware of the representational character of the picture, and an indirect demonstration, the twofold experience of seeing-in a subject has by experiencing through the direct perception of the picture what she can specifically focus on once she makes-believe that she is directly facing the world presented by the picture rather than the picture itself.<sup>11</sup> By means of these demonstrations, a subject may demonstratively refer either to the picture itself – as in the above token of (3) – or to the depicted object – as in the above utterance of (1).<sup>12</sup> Now, no matter which minimal broadening of the narrow context a traditionalist chooses to perform – that is, the one involving demonstrations or the one involving demonstrata – it remains that in order for a token of “that” to get a determinate referent, hence for the sentential token containing that token to get determinate truthconditions, an appeal to wide context is needed, hence contextualism can be vindicated. Let me explain why.

Suppose that demonstrations are the further parameters in narrow context. In order for narrow context to automatically determine the referent of an indexical in context given the indexical’s character, the character must be such that it explicitly points out which is the contextual factor that has to be mobilized in order for that indexical in that context to automatically get a referent. For instance, the character of “I” is expressed by something like “the agent in context”. As a result, given a certain narrow context c, it is automatic what is the referent of “I” in c: namely, what works as the agent parameter in that context, i.e. the agent in c.<sup>13</sup> Thus, in our case the character

of the demonstrative “that” must be expressed by something like “the demonstratum by the demonstration in (narrow) context”. Yet this fails to automatically provide a referent for a token of “that” such as the one figuring in the above utterance of (1). For no matter which demonstration is put in the narrow context so that the character of “that” explicitly points to it, that is, either the direct demonstration or the indirect demonstration; in the very same narrow context, both demonstrations can demonstrate either the picture (Madonna’s picture) or the depicted object (Madonna in the flesh), and it is a matter of wide context factors (in the case of the direct demonstration, specific awareness of the representational character of a picture; in the case of the indirect demonstration, specific attention to what it is depicted rather than to the picture itself, etc.) whether those demonstrations actually demonstrate one or the other entity. Hence, it is not the case that (minimally broadened) narrow context plus character automatically provides a referent for the token of a demonstrative such as “that” in the above utterance of (1); wide context is required, hence wide context is required to give that utterance determinate truthconditions.

On behalf of traditionalism, one might think that I have gone too fast. From Wittgenstein (1953) onwards, it is a notorious fact that one and the same perception can be directed upon different facets of reality – in Wittgenstein’s own examples, colour, shape, texture of an individual ... –, depending on which of these facets is contextually salient.<sup>14</sup> In order to take account of this, the character of “that” must be expressed by a more sophisticated description like “the relevant demonstratum by the demonstration in (narrow) context”. Once this is done, everything follows quite smoothly: given a certain

narrow context, the more sophisticated character of “that” picks out a certain individual as the referent of “that” in that context – as regards the above utterance of (1), either the picture or the depicted object – depending on which of these individuals is salient in that context for the demonstration involved in that very context.

Yet the problem is that again, it is wide context that says which of those individuals is salient for the demonstration involved in the narrow context. There is no such a thing as the salient demonstratum for a demonstration in a (narrow) context: as far as the utterance of (1) is concerned, both things – the picture, the depicted object – can be (narrow) contextually relevant for the demonstration involved, unless some other wide contextual factors are taken into account. Consider the indirect demonstration: it belongs to the fact that it is a twofold experience that in entertaining it, one can attend either to the picture or to the depicted object, even though both entities are (narrowly) contextually salient – perceived things surrounding the picture (the wall on which the picture is hung, etc.) are just ruled out of consideration. Now, switching attention from one to the other entity is a matter of wide context, i.e. of what becomes important for various pragmatic reasons to focus on: for instance, whether one is interested in grasping the properties of the picture or commenting on the properties of the depicted object. This would particularly evident if we considered an utterance of:

(9) That is beautiful!

uttered while facing Madonna’s picture. Even supposing that the utterer has selected the

indirect demonstration (so that it figures in the narrow context of the utterance), her interests appear to be decisive in settling whether the above token of “that” refers to Madonna’s picture or to Madonna herself. Things do not change if we take the direct demonstration into account. Suppose we utter (1) while facing a very realistic image of Madonna, say a three-dimensional real-size image of it (a wax statue, a moving puppet ...). Even if, or once, we know that we are facing just an image, we may sometimes be so absent-minded as to be led again into the illusion that we are facing Madonna herself.<sup>15</sup> In that case again, although both entities – Madonna and her image – are contextually salient, one must appeal to wide contextual factors (in this case, typically psychological factors such as mental lucidity, etc.) to decide whether in uttering a token “that” while having a certain direct demonstration, this demonstration directs ourselves either to the image or to the depicted object.

It is for that matter, moreover, that any other device a traditionalist may appeal to in order to solve the case pointed out by (1) in her favour would appear either pointless or artificial. A traditionalist might for instance reply that one such case shows that salientness itself is relative, so that the character of the demonstrative must also contain a certain hidden variable for modes of salientness (its most faithful expression thus becoming something like “the relevant (in mode M) demonstratum by the demonstration in (narrow) context”, where “M” is a variable for modes). Once the variable is contextually saturated – a certain mode of being salient is selected – then that character automatically provides a referent for “that” in a given (narrow) context.<sup>16</sup> Yet it is clear that such a move won’t do. There is no such a thing as a hidden variable for

modes of being salient; insofar as they are linked to entirely wide-contextual factors, those modes – if they are such – are utterly indeterminate. To postulate such a variable would imply an artificial way of restricting or selecting those modes.<sup>17</sup>

As I anticipated before, the traditionalist is not forced to minimally broaden narrow context by adding a demonstration parameter in it; she may rather put demonstrata in it. Yet it is now easy to show why even this move won't work. Once you put demonstrata in narrow context, in order for narrow context plus character to automatically provide a referent for a given token of "that", the character of this demonstrative must be rather expressed by something like "the demonstratum in context of the relevant demonstration". For, as I said before, character must explicitly point out to the narrow-contextual element that enters into the truthconditions of the sentential token containing that token of "that".<sup>18</sup> Yet again, it is contextually wide factors that say which demonstration is relevant in the case of our utterance of (1). In point of fact, a subject aware of the representational character of a picture entertains both the direct and the indirect, more complex, demonstration. Let us this time grant that once either demonstration is activated, a particular referent – the picture, the depicted object – is selected for the demonstration, insofar as that referent is just the demonstratum which figures in the narrow context as one of its parameters. Yet it is a contextually wide matter to settle which demonstration (the direct, the indirect) is activated (again, it can depend on the subject's interests, or on the subject's overall psychological state). So again, it is not the case that narrow context plus character provides a referent for the token of "that" in question, hence provides truthconditions for the utterance in which

that token occurs; one must also appeal to wide context. So, at least in cases like those of the above utterance of (1), wide context must be appealed to in a semantic role. Since it is enough for contextualism to be correct that one such case exists,<sup>19</sup> then contextualism appears to be vindicated.

To be more precise, nothing rules out that wide context has here to be appealed to also in a *pre-semantic* role, in order to select the right demonstratum parameter hence the right context of interpretation. For instance, suppose one uttered (1) while facing not a picture of Madonna, but a picture of Marilyn Monroe – she simply mistook a picture of Monroe for a picture of Madonna, probably because of the similarity between the two (pop)stars. In such a case, the utterance would turn out to be false, for the token of “that” would then refer to Marilyn, not to Madonna. In point of fact, pragmatic factors having to do with a negotiation as to the intentionality of a picture – whether a certain image is a picture of Madonna or a picture of Marilyn – would have presemantically settled that that image is a picture of Marilyn, hence that its (indirect) demonstratum is Marilyn, hence that the referent of that token of “that” is Marilyn and not Madonna. Yet again, this is not the role wide context is supposed to play with respect to the demonstration mobilized by the character of “that”. Here wide context implements so to speak that character, by selecting which is the salient demonstration that enables character, which points to such a demonstration in its linguistic expression, to pick out the demonstrative’s narrow contextual referent. So, this role of wide context is properly semantic, not presemantic.<sup>20</sup>

At this point, however, the traditionalist may perform an utterly different move.

Once we put demonstrata in narrow context, the fact that the descriptive content by means of which we have hitherto characterized the character of “that” does not completely determine “that”’s referent in one such context does not matter. For, after all, formally conceived character is just a function from (narrow) contexts to contents (referents). So, the only thing a character must contain from a formal point of view is the mere indication of the parameter in narrow context it must look for in order to provide the indexical a referent in that context. That is, it does not have to qualify that parameter in any conceptual terms, such as being a demonstratum in context of the relevant demonstration. Formally speaking, the character of any indexical has to express nothing more than the  $n^{\text{th}}$  coordinate in narrow context, so that its formal formulation limits itself to indicate such a coordinate. Thus, insofar as in the case of “that” the parameter in question coincides with its (narrow) contextual referent, which is precisely the case if that parameter is made by the demonstratum, nothing more is required to get a referent for that indexical in a given narrow context. From this point of view, therefore, the morale a traditionalist may draw from the case of our utterance of (1) is rather that this case shows that minimally broadening the narrow context with demonstrata is not one option along with others such as implementing it with demonstrations, but it is the option. For any other option simply fails to provide the right referent for an indexical such as “that” in narrow context. For example, insofar as the other option here considered puts demonstrations in narrow context, from the formal point of view it makes the character of “that” a function from (narrow) context to demonstrations, that is, a function that, given a certain (narrow) context, immediately

selects a certain parameter in that context, i.e. a certain demonstration, as the referent for “that” in that context. Yet intuitively demonstrations are not the right referents for “that”.

Yet this appeal to intuitions precisely shows where this final traditionalist move goes wrong. The reason why we appeal to formalism in the explanation of the semantics of indexicals is that it gives a formal way to describe what we characterize in informal semantic terms. By saying that the linguistic meaning of any pure indexical automatically determines a referent for that indexical in a (narrow) context, we informally mean that such a meaning contains conceptual qualifications that can be uniquely satisfied by an individual in that context, regardless of any further wide contextual factor (intentions, etc.); this is why that meaning can be expressed by a certain (improper)<sup>21</sup> definite description. For instance, in the case of “I”, the linguistic meaning of “I” says that, given a certain (narrow) context, the referent of “I” in that context is the only individual performing the agency role in that context; so, the referent of “I” in that context will be that individual; nothing else, no further wide contextual factor, is required to determine such a referent in that context. This is formally mapped by saying that “I” has a character which pairs (narrow) contexts with referents, i.e. it expresses a function that, for any given (narrow) context, immediately selects a certain parameter in that context, namely a certain agent, as the referent of “I” in that context. Now, the above utterance of (1) shows that there are cases in which this mapping does not work. From the formal point of view, one may go on saying that “that” expresses a function from (narrow) contexts to demonstrata, so that given a certain (narrow) context

that function immediately selects a certain parameter in that context, namely a certain demonstratum, as the referent of “that” in that context. Yet from the informal point of view we have seen that the linguistic meaning of “that”, as it turns out to be expressed by the description “the demonstratum in context of the relevant demonstration”, contains a conceptual qualification that can be satisfied by more than one individual – Madonna; Madonna's picture – in that very (narrow) context.

At this point, the traditionalist may say: so worse for the informal point of view. But clearly things go the other way round, not only because general considerations regarding the relationship between a formal and an informal approach to semantics would have that the formal approach can only provide a perspicuous way of representing what can also be stated at the informal approach, but also because if one has to account for the expressive power of language as we use it, it is the formal approach that yields way to the informal approach. Let us stick precisely to the case of indexicals and consider the case of temporal indexicals. As far as “today” is concerned, one may well say that the conceptual qualification that expresses its linguistic meaning, namely the one which says that the referent of “today” in a certain (narrow) context is the day of the context, is mapped by a character conceived as a formal function from narrow contexts to days such that, given a certain (narrow) context, it immediately selects the present day as the day parameter of that context, which is a set whose members are agent, time, space (and whatever else is considered necessary); hence, that character immediately selects the present day as the 2<sup>nd</sup> parameter of that set. Yet consider now “yesterday” and “tomorrow”. One may well say that these are pure

indexicals insofar as their linguistic meaning is given by a conceptual qualification that respectively says that the referent of “yesterday” in a certain (narrow) context is the day before the day of the context and that the referent of “tomorrow” in a certain (narrow) context is the day after the day of the context. Yet trivially there is no formal function that, given that narrow context, it immediately selects the day before the present day or the day after the present day respectively as the day parameters of that context, simply because those days are not such parameters! Put in another way, you can obviously construe the linguistic meaning of “yesterday” and “tomorrow” as a function from narrow contexts to (temporal) referents, provided that you recall that it is a descriptive function, i.e. a function having a certain descriptive content, and not a mere formal function that even a mechanism may operate on. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for spatial indexicals such as “there”, personal indexicals such as “you”, etc.

Before concluding, a final remark. The contextualism I have attempted at vindicating here is just moderate contextualism, namely, the version of contextualism that says not only that there are pragmatic processes that truthconditionally operate locally, i.e. at the subsentential level – this is also claimed by some variants of radical contextualism – but also that (subsentential) linguistic meaning is necessary, though not sufficient, in order for that truthconditional operation to be performed.<sup>22</sup> I indeed think that linguistic meaning cannot be either put aside or eliminated, as radical contextualism, primarily in the afore-mentioned variants, maintains. This has to do with the irreducible normativity of linguistic meaning – an issue I cannot deal with here.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lopes (forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup> At least from the seminal studies by Fauconnier (1985), Jackendoff (1975), and Nunberg (1979).

<sup>3</sup> As Predelli (2005) maintains, for formal purposes an utterance can be represented as a sentence - (narrow) context pair.

<sup>4</sup> We will see in the final part of this paper why the mapping between linguistic meaning and Kaplan's character is not perfect.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Recanati (2004a).

<sup>6</sup> See for this again Predelli (2005). Voltolini (2006) maintains that these pragmatic factors have basically to do with make-believe, i.e. with pretending that (in this case) the agent is the office's owner rather than the real writer of the message.

<sup>7</sup> As we are dealing with a context-sensitive expression such as a demonstrative, properly speaking there is nothing like the literal referent of a demonstrative, since demonstratives shift their reference according to context.

<sup>8</sup> Literally speaking, Kaplan (1989b:582) speaks of directing intentions as what demonstrative gestures externalize. Yet he goes on saying that "the directing intention is aimed at a perceived object" (ib:583;my italics).

<sup>9</sup> For this typical argument in favour of contextualism, cf. Recanati (1993:chap.14), (2004a:56-7).

<sup>10</sup> For a survey and a discussion of these traditionalists' moves, cf. Caplan (2003).

<sup>11</sup> On the twofold character of the seeing-in experience, cf. notoriously Wollheim (1980<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>12</sup> In his paper, Lopes gives an interesting explanation as to why pictorial perception is indirect – for it

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mobilizes only what he calls “descriptive perception”, and not also “motion-guiding” perception, as happens with direct perception – and yet it remains a demonstration – for it perceptually locates the depicted object in the egocentric space of the utterer. Yet for my purposes I can leave these interesting details on the background.

<sup>13</sup> This is what Recanati (2004b:1) puts by saying that the character is given by a token-reflexive rule.

<sup>14</sup> As is well known, those examples directly concern the problem of indeterminacy of ostensive definition. Cf. Wittgenstein (1953:§§28-35). Yet we can apply what Wittgenstein said directly to the perception lying behind ostension. Cf. on this also Kaplan (1979:396).

<sup>15</sup> Incidentally, this is why trompe-l’oeils are so attractive; they must be evaluated along with famous Gestalt cases of illusory perception, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, that continue to perceptually deceive us even once we know that they are illusory.

<sup>16</sup> This “indexicalist” move (the terminology comes again from Recanati (2004a)) a traditionalist may appeal to traces back at least to Stanley (2000) and Szabo (2001).

<sup>17</sup> Mutatis mutandis, the same must be said with respect to another “indexicalist” move the traditionalist might appeal to, that of adding a hidden domain variable for the quantifier underlying the description “the relevant demonstratum” occurring in the character’s expression, once that quantifier is taken as a restricted quantifier. Incidentally, I do not put much stress on these indexicalist moves, for even though by appealing to variable saturation indexicalism claims that there is no optionality in the process providing an utterance its truthconditions – saturation is a mandatory process in order for an utterance to have truthconditions, in Recanati’s (2004a:chap.7) terms – it remains that saturation is compatible with a wide contextual determination of those truthconditions, as the original treatment of impure demonstratives by Kaplan shows.

Curiously enough, Recanati (2004a:57) raises the very same charge of artificiality against the traditionalists’ original move of implementing narrow context for demonstratives by means of another parameter, whether it consists in demonstrations or in demonstrata. Thus, one may conclude that in point of fact that traditionalists’ move fared no better, for it simply allowed one to raise the very same charge

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some steps forwards.

<sup>18</sup> Here I immediately give the formulation of the character containing the precisification about relevance, in order just to skip the objection a traditionalist would put forward with respect to the more general formulation of the character not containing the adjective “relevant”. For this objection would be structurally similar to the one we have considered before with respect to the manoeuvre of adding demonstrations to narrow context and sticking to a correspondingly generic formulation of the character.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. on this again Recanati (2004a:116).

<sup>20</sup> I have considered this case only with respect to the traditionalist proposal that puts demonstrata in narrow context rather with respect to the traditionalist proposal that puts demonstrations in narrow contexts, for this case makes things even worse for the second proposal. If one reinterprets the case with respect to the second proposal, one has that also the wide context’s factor that has to do with the negotiation of the intentionality of the picture contributes to the semantic role of that context. For in this case also that factor operates in determining which is the salient demonstratum for the demonstration that occurs in narrow context (not the picture, but its depicted object, namely ... Marilyn, in this case!).

<sup>21</sup> Improper, for the fact that the description can be uniquely satisfied by an individual in a context means that it can be absolutely satisfied by more than an individual.

<sup>22</sup> For this way of carving out the logical space among different positions, cf. again Recanati (2004a). I here rule out of consideration that variant of radical contextualism which not only puts aside or eliminates linguistic meaning but also holds that truthconditions are determinate not (subsential) step by step, but directly at the sentential level. To my mind, by so doing it makes truthconditional determination a sort of magic. For instance, it would not be able to say why the above token of (4) is inappropriate.

<sup>23</sup> For something more about this issue, cf. Voltolini (2001, 2004). Many thanks to Dom Lopes for some illuminating discussions with him on the topic of demonstrative pictorial reference and to Andrea Iacona and Diego Marconi for their important comments to a previous version of this paper.