

# Perry, Castañeda, and ‘I’

Tomis Kapitan

Northern Illinois University

## 1. Introduction

Over a quarter century ago, John Perry and Hector-Neri Castañeda disputed the nature of first-person reference. Though united in their mutual appreciation of the unique roles of ‘I’ in human thought and action, they differed in their respective views of how first-person reference occurs and, more generally, over what should be expected of a semantical theory of indexicals.

Castañeda is no longer among us to defend his views, but Perry has gone on to develop a sophisticated reflexive-referential semantics within which his approach to indexicals is embedded. Yet, despite its explanatory power, I find that his theory does not fully resolve Castañeda’s demand that an account be given of a *speaker’s* ability to identify items indexically, in particular, identify through first-person uses of ‘I’. In what follows, I will explain why Castañeda’s concern still provides a challenge for Perry’s view of indexicals, and then develop a Castañeda-inspired alternative for resolving it.

## 2. Indexicals as Tools of Identification.

According to Perry, reference by means of indexical expressions occurs through a proper mix of indexical meaning—a property of expression types—with the contexts of utterance within which tokens of those types occur.

. . . a defining feature of indexicals is that the meanings of these words fix the designation of specific utterances of them in terms of facts about these specific utterances. The facts that the meaning of a particular indexical deems relevant are the contextual facts for particular uses of it.  
(Perry 1997, 594)

This interplay also characterizes the ways in which indexicals are used to identify items and to communicate about them. So, suppose I tell you,

(1) I’ll throw you the ball if you stand over there.

If you comprehend English, you might understand what I am saying, but there are at least four levels of cognition involved in so doing.

*First*, you perceive my utterance of (1). Minimally this involves hearing a certain sequence of sounds, or visually perceiving a certain inscription.

*Second*, you understand the words being used by accessing their public meanings. In particular, you grasp certain semantical rules for interpreting my indexicals. According to Perry, these rules included, for example,

I. If *u* is an utterance of ‘I’, the indexical content of *u* is the identifying condition, *being the speaker of u*.

**YOU.** If *u* is an utterance of 'you', the indexical content of *u* is the identifying condition, *being the addressee of u*.

**THERE.** If *u* is an utterance of 'there', the indexical content of *u* is the identifying condition, *being the salient locale to which the speaker of u directs attention*. (Perry 2001, 76).

Here, boldface is used to identify a propositional constituent—the subject matter of a proposition—while an italicized expression indicates an identifying property rather than the object that satisfies that property. An expression that is both italicized and in boldface, then, represents an identifying property that is a propositional constituent (Perry 2001, 25-26; 2005, 323).

Now suppose that **u** is the event of my utterance of the sentence (1). By applying these rules alone, you reach the proposition,

(2) ***The speaker of u*** will throw the ball to ***the addressee of u*** if the latter stands in ***the salient locale to which the speaker of u directs attention***.

This displays a content of my utterance that is *reflexive* because it is about that utterance. Moreover, it provides the “cognitively relevant” content of my utterance, mediating both my attempt to communicate with indexicals and your effort to interpret and identify what I am talking about.

Of course, (2) does not specify what Perry calls the *official* or *referential content* of my utterance of (1), that is, what he also describes as,

- what is said (2001, p. 19)
- what is believed (2001, p. 19)
- the incremental truth conditions of a sentence (2000, p. 344)
- the content that is relevant in evaluating correlated counterfactuals.

That is, staying within these first two levels alone, you could understand (2) without knowing who is throwing the ball, to whom it is being thrown, or in what direction it will be thrown. Something else is required to get this.

So a *third* factor must be introduced, namely, your knowledge of the relevant facts about the context of my utterance, viz., who the speaker is, when and where it was uttered, and, other relevant features of the context, say, my gestures.

Then, with this knowledge in place, you advance to the *fourth* level, that is, an interpretation of my utterance that involves determining my referents. This gets to you the official content of my utterance of (1), where ‘I’ gets interpreted as me, the speaker, ‘you’ to you, the hearer, and ‘there’ to the place you inhabit.

In sum, you work *from* your perception of my utterance (level I), your grasp of the meanings of ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘there’ (level II), and your perception of relevant contextual factors (level III), *to* the determination (identification) of my referents (level IV). In so doing, you are guided by the meanings of the indexicals in exploiting context to obtain the relevant unary identifying conditions, thus,

*being the speaker of u*  
*being the one addressed through u*  
*being the locale to which the speaker of u directs attention.*

Once you have these, you can identify the referential content of my utterance by following semantic rules that specify the referents of the indexicals as being those items that satisfy the associated identifying conditions. Since the latter involve facts about particular utterances, and because indexical identification takes place through such conditions, we may speak of them as *utterance-reflexive*.

[OPTIONAL: Some qualifications are needed. For one thing, there are non-standard uses of ‘I’, e.g., as free restricted variables or as quasi-indicators (Castañeda 1983, 319-20), but these are not first-person identificatory uses of ‘I’. Cases of pretense, answering machines, and plain old notes, present more direct challenges (cf., Predelli 1998, 2005, 43-53; Corazza 2004, chp. 5; Perry 2005, 328-334).

- Suppose a caller hears the words “I am not here now” on an answering machine. Presumably the recorder of the message intended the caller to interpret ‘now’ as the time during which the message is *heard*—the decoding time, rather than the encoding time—‘here’ as the locale that the caller *thinks* he has connected with, and ‘I’ as the person the caller *hopes* to speak with.
- The caller does not rely on contextual cues picked up from the context in which the utterance was recorded, that is, *when* or *where* it was recorded, or, for that matter, *who* actually uttered the recorded words, for this information might be unavailable.
- Still, the caller must rely on some parameters of the context of decoding the perceived utterance, e.g., the number dialed, the name the caller associates with that number, additional recorded information (if any), etc., social conventions associated with recorded messages, etc.
- Though the standard default rules linking ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘here’ with the speaker, time, and place of utterance-production are violated, identification *is still an utterance-reflexive process*. The circumstances in which decoding occurs still constitute a context of utterance, for the one who set up the recording on that machine assumes that the caller will rely on the said information, gathered from perceiving the utterance of that recorded message and contextual facts about that decoding in order to interpret the indexical utterances. The non-standard rules covering such cases would still be fashioned in terms of contexts of utterance.<sup>1]</sup>

Indexicality is integral to the mechanisms of interpretation on this view, that is, indexical sub-utterances introduce identifying conditions that not only denote the referents (Perry 2001, p. 190) but are essential to the cognitive significance of the indexically-conveyed utterances. If I understand him correctly, Perry, like Castañeda, is enough of a Fregean to think that *reference does not occur without identification*. But while indexical reference is mediated, the identifying conditions are not themselves part of the official content of utterances. On Perry’ account, indexicals remain directly referential, contributing only their references to the official content, that is, to what is said about the world and, hence, to what must be taken into account in counterfactual considerations.

### **3. A Problem for Perry’s Account**

So far so good. If we confine our attention to the *interpretation* of indexicals, Perry’s account seems to provide all we could ask for.

Yet, something has been left out of the picture. In his response to Perry's discussion of his own views, Castañeda emphasized that the semantical rules for singular reference must not only provide criteria for a hearer's identification of the speaker's referents, but also criteria for the speaker's own identifications. Here's what he wrote:

The fundamental semantical rules governing singular reference serve two crucial purposes:

- (I) they provide criteria for the application of singular terms by a speaker of the language;
  - (ii) they provide criteria for [a] hearer's identification of the entities referred to by the speaker.
- (Castañeda 1983, p. 323).

Castañeda goes on to emphasize that since there can be no language hearer without a speaker, then semantic rules must serve purpose (I) before they can serve purpose (II). That is, very simply, a *speaker* must first identify what he or she is talking about in order to communicate about it or form any intentions concerning it. And if I understand Castañeda correctly, semantics is as relevant for the speaker as it is for the hearer. That is, the meanings of 'I', 'you' and 'there' in (1) may have been as instrumental in *my* picking out particular persons and a specific place as it was in yours.

Thus, perhaps I did not know your name, but I could pick you out as *you*, and perhaps in the spur of the moment I could only identify the place where I wanted to throw the ball as a *there*. I have identified items indexically, but plainly, I did not have to do what you had to do; I did not have to first perceive my own utterance and then interpret it by recourse to contextual parameters in accordance with familiar, or non-standard, utterance-reflexive procedures.

Obviously, tokens must be *produced* before they can be interpreted, and they are not blindly produced; one cannot attempt to communicate about things unless one first identifies them. Utterances are produced as a consequence of these antecedent identifications by the speaker or thinker. My utterance of (1), for instance, was an *input* of your interpretive process, but an *output* of the executive process whereby I identified things indexically and then attempted to communicate to you about them.

For these reasons, Castañeda objected to the familiar Kaplan-style rule for the first-person pronoun that Perry (1983) cites as "intuitively plausible," namely,

**K-I.** In any statement in which it occurs, *I* designates the speaker of the statement.

A rule that he, Castañeda, subsequently refined to

**K-I.IND** In any statement in which an indexical use of the first-person pronoun occurs, that use designates the speaker of the statement.

This rule, Castañeda argued, cannot be what *guides* the speaker or thinker in making his or her own executive identifications by means of first-person pronouns. One applies this rule in determining *who* produced a given utterance, in which case the utterance must first be produced. But in order to produce the utterance the speaker must already be referring through a first-person pronoun and this, in turn, requires *thinking* in first-person terms. Obviously the speaker is not guided by a rule like **K-I** or **K-I.IND** in doing the latter, for if that were so then the speaker would have to determine who authored a given utterance in order to produce that utterance. Yet, it is surely implausible that I would have to first

determine that I am the utterer of an 'I' token is *in order to* use 'I' to refer to myself. In short, no interpretation of indexical tokens without antecedent production of those tokens, and no antecedent production without indexical identifications.

Let's apply this line of thought to an example that is featured in Perry's *Reference and Reflexivity* (2001), and which in his *Identity, Personal Identity and the Self* (2002) he calls a "Castañeda example" (p. 202) because it involves reflexive awareness which is not self-awareness. Discussing Ernst Mach's surprising discovery that the shabby pedagogue he saw entering a Vienna streetcar was really *himself* reflected in a mirror, Perry notes that the statements,

- (1) That man is a shabby pedagogue.
- (2) I am a shabby pedagogue.
- (3) Mach is a shabby pedagogue.

have the same referential content but differ cognitively. What is the difference? Perry writes:

To utter (1) sincerely, Mach needs to believe that the person he is attending to is a shabby pedagogue. To utter (3) sincerely, he needs to believe that the person named by his use of 'Mach' is a shabby pedagogue. He does not need to believe either of these things to sincerely assert (2). But he does need to believe that the speaker of the utterance he is making is a shabby pedagogue" (*Reference and Reflexivity*, p. 117)

Taking Perry's words at face value, Mach would have had to think of his own utterance **u** of a sentence in order to refer to himself via the first-person pronoun and sincerely assert (2), in which case he must cognize the identifying condition *being the speaker of u* in order to sincerely assert (2).

But this can't be right. Mach need not have uttered any words whatever in order to think the thought expressible by (2), and thereby to identify himself via 'I'. In fact, Mach's own narrative indicates that he *didn't* utter anything, but merely *thought* that the person he saw is a shabby pedagogue, and subsequently, that he himself is a shabby pedagogue, i.e., (2) (Mach 1959, 4).

Suppose, then, we shift from identification in terms of utterances to identification in terms of thoughts qua psychological events. What would the relevant semantical rule be? Perhaps this:

**I'** If **u** is a first-person thought, then the indexical content of **u** is the identifying condition, *being the thinker of u*.

where **u** is the event of Mach thinking (2). The referent of the internal token of 'I' would then be the person that satisfies the unary condition,

*being the thinker of u*.

In such a case, the relevant condition is not utterance-reflexive but *thought-reflexive*.

This doesn't help matters. Mach did not need to think of himself as the *thinker of u* order to identify himself in a first-person way. How could he have thought *about* his thinking of (2) unless he first *had*

the thought that (2)? And how could he have had that thought unless he first identified himself in a first-person way? But if that is so, then the identifying condition, *being the thinker of u*, was not how he identified himself.

Plainly, to identify himself as ‘I’ Mach did not need to consider himself *as* a thinker of a particular first-person thought any more than he identified himself *as* a speaker of a particular utterance of a first-person pronoun. In short, while the first-person pronoun does express meanings that yield ways of identifying, Perry has accounted only for the hearer’s identification of an ‘I’ referent. The identifying condition that Mach used in referring to himself in the first person *in the course of* thinking (2) is simply not captured by Perry’s version of the utterance-reflexive—or thought reflexive—account.

[OPTIONAL: A similar difficulty is evident in Perry’s discussion of Stretch, the dog. He rightly notes that one can make distinct demonstrative references to a dog via the statement *that dog is that dog*. But his explanation on p. 89 specifies the identifying conditions of these two utterances of ‘that dog’—the indexical content of that expression—in terms of those very utterances. Again, this works fine for the hearer’s interpretation, but it puts the cart before the horse to suppose that the speaker must think of the dog in terms of what the speaker of those utterances attends to. That the sub-utterances create two different cognitive paths associated with different perceptions on the hearer’s part (pp. 90-91), leaves wholly unanswered how the speaker identifies Stretch. The speaker cannot think of himself as attending to the dog without first attending to it and, hence, identifying it. How does he do that? I don’t see that Perry has an explanation. To be sure, a distinct content must be associated with each demonstrative phrase if ‘that dog is that dog’ is to represent a surprising discovery *for the speaker*, but rules framed in terms of utterance-reflexive meanings or modes, like **I** or **I'**, are not the key to explaining this difference. ]

[OPTIONAL Note that Corazza (2004, p. 185), also offers a pure interpreter’s point of view on ‘I’: “There is a rule each competent speaker applies when using the first-person pronoun. If one looks in a dictionary one can read that ‘I’ is “a pronoun used by the speaker or writer referring to himself or herself”. This is all one needs to know. . . the rule, or character of ‘I’ . . . is no more mysterious than the other rules we follow in our everyday linguistic practice. When using ‘I’ we all follow and apply the same rule.”]

I fear that the difficulty stems from the fact that Perry’s semantics of indexicals is dominated by a concern for interpretation, by what some refer to as *consumer semantics*, typified in his opening paragraph of the *Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language* (edited by Michael Devitt):

In this essay I examine how we use indexicals. The key function of indexicals, I claim, is to help the audience find supplementary, utterance-independent channels of information about the object to which or to whom the speaker refers. (Perry, “Using Indexicals,” p. 314)

Perry is not alone. Those who champion the image of *consumption* as the key to understanding the representative functions of language (e.g., Kaplan 1989b, 602-3, and Millikan 1993, 86-88) are impressed by the fact that we are born into linguistic communities and, as such, are constantly exposed to words with prepackaged meaning before we utter them or think in their terms. Yet, what we directly consume are particular utterances, and consumption of utterances, like consumption of canned goods, presupposes commodity production. The latter is not a semantically-blind process for it is guided by

linguistic meaning just as much as the interpretive process is. We cannot neglect this executive aspect of language usage if we are to be sensitive to the demands of a *producer* semantics. Very simply, “language must be spoken before it is heard and interpreted” (Castañeda 1989b, 116), and this, in a nutshell, is Castañeda’s criticism of the type of account of indexicals that Perry has developed.

At this point, I am inclined to say that while John Perry is dear, truth is dearer still, and what follows next is the result of my search for truth. But given that truth is notoriously elusive, and given that I don’t have the confidence or talent of an Aristotel, I’m not sure whether I will ever find truth. So, I cannot be certain whether I’ll every stumble across anything dearer than John Perry.

#### 4. Two Types of Indexical Identification

Drawing a contrast between executing an indexical reference and interpreting that reference, leads naturally to a contrast between a speaker’s or thinker’s *executive* indexical identification of something and an *interpretive* identification. As I have indicated, the latter is an utterance-reflexive process, but executive identification is not utterance-reflexive at all since it does not require familiarity with the utterance and its context. There are also causal and temporal differences between execution and interpretation insofar as utterances are antecedent inputs into the process of interpretation but outputs of executive identification.

[OPTIONAL: Even if indexical tokens are conceived of as mental representations, the thinker who initiates an identification does not first become aware of these tokens and then interpret them by recourse to some sort of context in which they occur. At best, such mental tokens occur simultaneously with the producer’s identifications, not antecedently as causal inputs.]

A further difference between the two types of identification is evidenced whenever a speaker has no means of identification other than indexically, for instance, when a demonstrative like *that* or a demonstrative phrase, *that over there*, represents the only way of picking out what suddenly looms into visual or auditory awareness. Consider Kaplan’s case of the kidnapped heiress locked in the trunk of a car who thinks,

(3) It is quiet here now.

without any other means of locating herself. Her indexical representations are *autonomous* inasmuch as their having the content they do does not depend upon her possession of other ways of distinguishing or describing what she is thinking about. When the heiress says *it is quiet here now*, the very fact that she is able to draw a contrast, that she knows it is quiet *now*, as distinct from quiet *then* (say, when she was abducted, or when the car was speeding down the roadway), reveals that she is discriminating between her present temporal location and other times. More dramatically, suppose she were drugged and placed in a large, silent, fully darkened, weightlessness chamber; regaining consciousness, she finds herself floating, bewildered, with no idea where she is beyond what she thinks with *It is quiet here now*, a thought that would undoubtedly be true.

*Autonomy* marks a significant divide between executive and interpretive identification. An interpreter’s cognitive movement is *from* token-perception *to* determination of its referent, and this could not be achieved without independent familiarity with the candidates. Thus, hearing my utterance of

(1) I'll throw you the ball if you stand over there.

you must be able to identify me separately from resolving my 'I', and perhaps what you are caused to think is better captured by,

(4) He'll throw the ball to me if I stand over here.

Interpreting an indexical token is never an autonomous identification that settles on a referent via its utterance alone, but a context-dependent process of mating uttered tokens to *independently identified* items (as Ruth Millikan point out, 1993, 269-71). This is *not* the procedure of an executor, say, the heiress.

[OPTIONAL: There is a further difference between speaker's identification and interpreter's; a speaker has room for creative maneuver that an interpreter lacks. Interpreting someone's *You are in big trouble!*

requires exploiting the meaning conventionally associated with 'you'. But within certain limits, a speaker has options. Perceiving a tottering barn on a drive through the countryside I might say: *That barn is dilapidated*, yet, given the same visual input, I might have used: *This barn is dilapidated*. Or, noticing someone approaching in the distance I think: *That person is running*, but I might have thought instead: *He is running*. Again, some like to package self-criticism with the second-person, *You're a fool!*, or even in the third-person, rather than with, *I'm a fool!* (we might speculate about the emotional payoff). Which indexical type a speaker employs is a matter of his or her own discretion in a way that interpretation is not, and this is another reason why the speaker's identification is appropriately labeled executive.]

In sum, a speaker's identificatory use of indexicals is discretionary, possibly autonomous, but not utterance-reflexive, whereas an interpreter's identification is utterance-reflexive but neither autonomous nor discretionary.

## 5. Semantic Duality

Now we face a problem: assuming that indexical meanings guide both types of identification, then how do we explain the procedural differences between the two?

Consider the cognitive difference between speaker and hearer in the following case. Suppose you listen to an audio tape and hear a voice saying,

(5) It is raining today.

By following a semantical rule like,

Take the referent of an utterance of 'today' to be the day in which that utterance is encoded.

you load in the utterance parameter—utterance **u**, let's call it—and thereby access a reflexive content, viz.,

(6) It rained on the day in which **u** occurred.

If you find out additional information about the context of **u**, say, you examine the label on the tape, then you obtain an identifying condition that enables you to pick out a particular day, say, April 10, 2000.

But notice that the speaker did not pick out a duration as the day in which a particular utterance of ‘today’ occurred. That concept—*being a day in which an utterance of an utterance of ‘today’ occurred*—is not even similar to the concept, *being today*, that guided the speaker. Similarly, you, the interpreter, do not identify April 10, 2000 in the manner the speaker did, viz., as *today*. You both employ concepts associated with the linguistic type ‘today’, but you identify that particular day differently. You cannot think of a given day as being the day on which a certain utterance occurred without conceiving of an utterance, but one can think, *What lousy luck we’re having today*, without considering any utterance whatever.

In sum, that interpretive meanings guide through utterance-reflexivity but executive meanings do not presents a challenge to the *meaning-parity* of indexicals, that is, to the idea that communication by means of a indexical token requires both speaker and hearer to avail themselves of the same meaning. If you prefer your philosophy to be packaged in terms of arguments, the challenge is as follows:

- (1) To identify something indexically is to be guided by the meaning of an appropriate indexical type.
- (2) The meaning used to guide interpretive identification can be accurately described through a rule specifying how utterance-reflexive identity conditions are *outputs* given the utterance and contextual parameters as *inputs*.
- (3) The meaning used in executive identification cannot be described through such a rule.

Therefore,

- (4) The meaning of an indexical type utilized in the process of executive identification differs from the meaning used in the course of its interpretation.

Accordingly, a fundamental *duality* affects the identificatory uses of every indexical expression, involving a *coordination* of indexical meanings built into the tacit knowledge that constitutes a user’s linguistic competence (and that we can explore if the discussion goes that way). Communication with indexicals requires only this sort of coordination between executive and interpretive meanings, not meaning parity. In addition to their essential *semantic* context-dependence, this systematic meaning duality is what distinguishes indexicals semantically.<sup>2</sup>

## 6. Executive Identification as Perspectival

If utterance reflexivity is not the key for understanding executive identification, then what is? The executive meaning of indexical types does not secure it, anymore than interpretative meaning suffices for interpretation. In both cases, an appeal to something in addition to indexical meaning is required. What else could this be in the case of executive identification? Contextual parameters? But what sort of contexts?

Taking a cue from Castañeda that indexicality reflects a thinker's experience of objects from a particular point of view or spatio-temporal perspective (1990c, 68), then perhaps an indexical referent is singled out through its relation to the executor's point of view, and thus, because relations to the speaker's standpoint are constitutive of the identifying mechanisms employed.

[OPTIONAL: The executive referent satisfies a unique *perspectival* condition which includes relations to the speaker's standpoint, or, as Castañeda preferred to say, a particularized perspectival property (1999, 69-73).]

The general idea is nothing new, nor unique to Castañeda. The interest is in the details. If with,  
(7) You should be happy; we will have fun here today.

I address Vivian in Chicago on morning of July 12, 2008, my words reveal my relations to a particular person, time, and place. I must be *in* Chicago, *addressing* Vivian on July 12, 2008, and it is in virtue of these facts that I can identify what I do *as* I do. In this sense, my words are autobiographical—biographical for my listeners—while the same is not true of an utterance of,

(8) Vivian should be happy; we will have fun in Chicago on July 12, 2008  
or, for that matter, for the demonstrative,

(9) She should be happy; we will have fun there then.  
even though I might be identifying the very same person, place and time.

Every executive identification requires a spatial or a temporal array of salient *immediate data* (objects, events, qualities, etc.) of which one is directly aware to varying degrees.

- Different modalities of consciousness, auditory, visual, tactile, imaginary, dreamlike, memory, proprioceptive, and so on, are associated with diverse arrays of data, even when contemporaneous. For example, the spatial and temporal ordering of sounds one hears during a certain interval is an auditory array that might be simultaneous with a visual array of colored shapes.
- The data are ordered in terms of either their spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal *positions*, each of which is either a presented volume, a duration, or a pair of such, of arbitrary extent, partly fixed by the presented distance and direction from the *point of origin* of the identifying act. As such, each immediate datum has a *vector* character (Whitehead 1978, 55, 237-239), and each *this, that, then, there*, etc. are vector-anchored contents located at particular places in a perspective. Sometimes, it is the spatial position alone that distinguishes the items identified, as reflected by the two uses of 'that dog' in Perry's case of Stretch. Sometimes, temporal factors play a more prominent individuating role, as in anaphoric reference expressed through 'the former,' 'the latter,' 'the previous one,' or, when through a single window a person thinks the non-trivial,  
(10) This ship [observing the bow go by] is this ship [observing the stern go past].
- Any such array of immediate data constitutes a *perspective*, properly speaking, allowing us to speak of both its point of origin—the point around which the perspective is centered and that is typically presented as *here* and *now*—and the position of every other item within it as being *within* the perspective.<sup>3</sup>

It is not position within a perspective alone that secures an executive indexical identification. That also depends on how a thinker conceptualizes the identified item. Since I can be in Chicago on July 12, 2008 without identifying either the place or time as *here* and *today*, then when I do think,

(7) You should be happy; we will have fun here today.

I must encounter or classify my own standpoint as being *here* and qua *today*. Even if Vivian kept the very same position within my perspective, I might have identified her demonstratively as *she* rather than as *you*. Executive indexical meanings are concepts or ways in which items are apprehended and cognized.<sup>4</sup>

By being identified indexically, moreover, an item acquires an indexical status; a person becomes a *you* by being addressed and a *that man* by being demonstrated. Prior to that, it has merely its vector character in a perspective. Indexical status is wholly a contingent and extrinsic feature of an entity. Thus, no object in the external world is intrinsically a *you*, a *this*, a *here*, or an *I*, for satisfying an indexical identifying condition is invariably a relational property of an item possessed only in relation to an experient subject who distinguishes it as such. However, given that an act of identification can endure over an interval, two utterances of ‘I’ can be associated with one and the same identifying condition. Also, because objects can move within a single perspective, then a dynamic *this*, *that*, *he*, etc. can be associated with an ordering of positions.

While what is identified indexically need not itself be an immediate datum of direct awareness, access to it is parasitic upon some such datum. When I gaze at a dot on a map and think,

(11) That city is north of Prague.

I am identifying a particular city, say, Berlin, but I am directly aware of the dot, and the presented dot is the *index* of my executive act, namely, what I explicitly “latch on to” in the course of picking something out (Anscombe 1975, 92). Identification is *direct* when the identified item is the index, as when I compare two colors in my visual field and think *this one is darker than that one*. Identification is *deferred* when made indirectly through an index, as with my reference to Berlin in (11) in terms of the dot on the map. The dot is not a logical subject in the thought I express with (11), though it might well be identified indexically in a distinct thought, e.g.,

(12) The city represented by that dot is north of Prague

to which I am committed by virtue of my deferred identification in (11).

Deferred executive identification is secured through an *orienting relation* or “relation of contiguity” (Nunberg 1993, 19-20) between the identified item and the index, a relation the executor must grasp.

- In the Berlin example, the city is related to the dot through a **representational** relation, as is more clearly shown in (12).
- On other occasions a causal relation is involved, as in, *This fellow is clever*, having just read an essay on indexicals, namely, the relation of **authoring** such and such paper.
- A relation of **temporal precedence** is evident in the case of ‘yesterday’ and a part-to-whole relation may be relevant for *Today has been rainy* or *This town is boring*, where, the indices associated with ‘Today’ and ‘this town’ are temporal parts of more extended entities.

The *orientation* of an identified item is a relational property determined by its orienting relation to an index, e.g., *being the city represented by that dot*.

For purposes of a uniform analysis, we can even say that when identification is direct, there is still an orienting relation, namely, *identity*, in which case the orientation of the identified item is the property of *being identical to the index*.

Both direct and deferred identification might be present in,

(13) His mother is rich

with which I make a deferred reference with ‘his mother’ while picking out a man in the room directly through *his*. A more difficult example is,

(14) I am parked out back.

Assuming that this is elliptical for,

(15) My car is parked out back.

then ‘I’ in (14) embodies a deferred identification to the car even though ‘I’ seems to express a direct reference to myself.

## 7. Analyzing Executive Identifying Conditions

Here’s the general pattern for analyzing executive identifying conditions.

Suppose  $Y$  is an agent,  $o$  is a spatial-temporal locale occupied by  $Y$ , and  $m$  is a modality of consciousness (visual, auditory, etc.), then the triple  $(o, Y, m)$  determines a *perspective* of  $Y$  at  $o$ .

The locale  $o$  may itself be analyzed in terms of a pair  $(t, v)$  consisting of a time (duration)  $t$  and a place (volume)  $v$ , or, through an ordering of such pairs  $\langle (t, v), (t', v'), \dots \rangle$  when the agent and immediate data are in motion relative to each other during the course of the experience.

Letting ‘ $p$ ’ represent a position within a perspective, viz., either a time  $t$ , a place  $v$ , or a pair  $(t, v)$ , determined by a presented distance and direction from  $o$ , and  $d$  be a datum, then each index  $d(p)$  within the perspective  $(o, Y, m)$  is positioned datum, viz.,  $d$  as located at  $p$ , viz.,  $d$ -at- $p$ , or,  $d$ -from- $p$ .

Let  $X$  be identified by means of index  $d(p)$  and executive indexical meaning  $k$  within a perspective  $(o, Y, m)$ . If the identification of  $X$  is deferred, then  $X$  is picked out by means of a relational property

$$R[d(p)]$$

fixed by an orienting relation  $R$  linking  $X$  to  $d(p)$ . The mode of presentation, can then be represented by

$$k(R[d(p)])$$

However, if the identification is direct, then the orienting relation  $R$  is identity and the mode can be represented equally well by

$$k(=[d(p)])$$

or, more simply, by,

$$k([d(p)])$$

[OPTIONAL: Every indexical meaning can then be represented as a partial function from sets of immediate data and orientations to individuating executive modes. All executive modes are “object-dependent” in the sense that their existence depends upon the existence of the indices. Modes of direct identification are also referent-dependent in the sense that they would not exist apart from what satisfies them, their referents, but the modes of deferred identification have a being apart from the items that might satisfy them. Finally, every such mode is private because only the thinker to whom the perspective belongs can apprehend that index  $d(p)$  because the position  $p$  has meaning only within the perspective.]

Examples serve to illustrate the pattern of analysis. Consider my use of the second person pronoun in uttering,

(7) You should be happy; we will have fun here today.

while talking on the phone to Vivian. The relevant perspective associated with my ‘you’ is fixed in terms of me, my position, and the auditory modality. If the reference is deferred, and the index is the sound of a voice located in the phone’s receiver at point  $p$ , viz., [sound at  $p$ ], then Vivian’s orientation is the property of *producing* the sound at  $p$ . By adding the indexical form *you*, we arrive at this picture of my second-person individuating mode:

*you* (producing [sound at  $p$ ])

through which I identify Vivian.

If I am thinking of Vivian as *she*, then my individuating mode for her is:

*she* (producing [sound at  $p$ ]).

On the other hand, if (7) reflects a *direct* second-person identification, say, if I am looking at Vivian while addressing her so that Vivian herself, from the given perspective, is the index, then my identifying mode would fit this schema:

*you* ([Vivian at  $p$ ])

or, if direct awareness of persons is not to your liking,

*you* (producing [Vivian-percept at  $p$ ])

## 8. First Person Identification

Expectedly, the first person has problems of its own. Consider, my use of the first person in,

(16) I should be happy; we will have fun here today..

Even if we agree with Castañeda that a primitive generic *self* concept or *I* concept is involved, and we agree that the person, that self-reflective, feeling, desiring, experiencing agent that I am, is the *referent* of ‘I’, we must still inquire into the identifying condition and the index. What are these?

Perhaps the simplest answer is that first-person reflexive awareness is direct, not deferred. In that case, the index is myself, TK, occupying the point of origin  $p$  of my present perspective, where the orientation is being identical to that index, and the identifying condition is,

*I* ([TK at  $p$ ]).

But I don't buy that analysis since I don't think that the whole organism that I am—whether it be an enduring physical system or a four dimensional sequence—is the *index*: I am no more directly aware of the whole of TK than I am of Mont Blanc.

Yet, not everything can be identified as an *I*. Why so? Why does the executive *I* concept apply to some things but not others? More figuratively, that makes me an *I*? Why can one apply the executive *I* concept *only* to oneself, whereas one can apply *you, he/she, his/hers*, etc. to others as well as oneself? What makes me unique with respect to what I can identify in first-person terms?

In my first-person identification, I view the organism that I am “from the inside,” through introspection, proprioception, or visceral interoception. I cannot be directly aware of anyone else in these ways. In so doing, I am *directly* aware of something **as experiencing**, and if I conceptualize what I am aware of—which is what I do in first-person identification—I cannot help but think of that something as an active subject, that is, as an experiencing, thinking, and reacting thing or process, a *res cogitans*, albeit physical. This is a direct access that is privileged in that no one else has it to that something, myself. (Note that in *Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self* (p 215), Perry says that we view the world from our agent-relative point of view, centered on the here and now, where the “agent” is the thinker, speaker, and doer.)

Perhaps the index is an individuated *part* of the entire organism, a part of which the agent alone can be directly aware. Perhaps this part is a particular state of the organism, say, a bodily feeling of hunger or of desiring to eat blueberries, or a believing that Berlin is north of Prague, states individuated by their content as well as their form. Yet, how could such states occasion my *I* identification? Only because I understand them to be *my own*. But then I am presupposing first-person identification.

Here's a further proposal. The index is the maximally integrated perspective comprised of both (i) the concurrent perspectives belonging to each sensory and introspective modalities and (ii) the associated emotional, conative, cognitive reactions of which one is co-aware during a given interval of awareness (cf., Castañeda 1999, 244, 263; Lockwood 1989, 88-89). Particular states of experiencing and reacting are seen as belonging to it, not to something else, and consequently, it is viewed as both a receptor of stimuli, and the seat of reaction to that stimuli. When classified as an *I*, then it is the “me here and now,” a “self,” of which I, and I alone, am directly aware.

If this is accurate, then taking the index of first-person identification to be some such comprehensive unity *C* existing over a temporal interval *t*, and whose spatial point of origin is *v*, we have this analysis of the executive *I*-mode that guides my *direct* first-person identification:

$$I ([C \text{ at } (t,v)]).$$

This analysis works if it makes sense to say that “me-now”—a person-stage perhaps, or, a “self” of relatively short duration—is an entity that can be identified and referred to. However, it cannot exhaust first-person thoughts since we also identify ourselves in first-person ways as enduring beings, as in, *I have been lecturing in Madrid for twelve years*, or *I am gradually losing weight*. How do we understand my first-person identification of the persisting organism that I am? The identification must be deferred, though the index can be the same as in the direct case. What differs is the orientation; the persisting *I* is not identical to the index, but “has” or is “constituted by” such indices. If so, then the relevant mode of presentation is representable as,

$I$  (having [ $C$  at  $(t,v)$ ])

where ‘having’ expresses the compositional tie between the comprehensive integrated unities and the persisting  $I$ .

There are, then, two ways of thinking of oneself in first-person terms; as a brief unity of vector contents and associated reactions, and, as an temporally extended organism to which such momentary unities belong. The former is direct, the latter deferred. There is a subtle reciprocity between these two types of  $I$  identification. Thought about an enduring self, a person, an organism, is derivative from direct awarenesses of integrated unities each of which is salient by way of contrast with something else, be it a person, an object, an event, etc. (Castañeda 1999, 275-277). By noting certain similarities in the patterns of experiencing, emotion, effort and reaction among these unities, we form the notion of an enduring locus of experience and action. The executive  $I$  concept is the indexical method of keeping track of this persisting self through these salient indices. However, it is something we gain upon noticing the similarities in the patterns, in which case all first-person identifications depend upon our *first* having a sense of the enduring organisms that we are, while this, in turn, depends on our direct encounter with the momentary beings that we are. This is not to preclude indices of first-person identifications from themselves being identified as  $I$ s, but only to point out that there is no identification of these as  $I$ s apart from a concept of a persisting entity with which they are associated, whether as stages, states, or aspects.

Note that this does not provide an analysis of the *generic* concept expressed by ‘I’.

## 8. Generalized Reflexivity

From the pattern of analysis set forth in section 6 above, it can be seen that the identifying conditions of an executive identification are *reflexive* in their own way. That is, an executive indexical referent is identified in virtue of the position of an index *within* a perspective. Using Perry’s terminology, the perspective is an *unarticulated constituent* within that content, and an executive identifying condition is reflexive because whatever satisfies it embodies a relation to that perspective. With such *perspectival-reflexivity*—a species of the thought-reflexivity mentioned above—the executive mode of presentation has no existence apart from an immediate datum, and the latter, in turn, has no identity, no existence, apart from the perspective of the state. Added to the utterance-reflexivity of interpretation, we achieve a generalized reflexive-referential account of indexicals that is sensitive to speakers’ as well as interpreters’ usage, and that’s how it should be.

## Notes

1. The contrast of *decoding time* with the *encoding time* can be found in Filmore 1997, 61, and, throughout, the notion of a *context of utterance* should be construed broadly to include the environs of the utterance, e.g., the speaker, time, place, the accompanying gestures, etc. in short “whatever parameters are needed” (Kaplan 1989b, 591). Predelli 1998, 401-403, is among those who argue that the answering machine cases constitute evidence against the “traditional view” of indexicals according to which indexicals “are always correctly evaluated by taking into consideration the context of utterance (or inscription)” and looks, instead, to a context “intended as relevant by the speaker.” However, since an interpreter can ascertain the speaker’s intentions only by relying on cues embedded within the circumstances in which the utterance is perceived, it is still a context of utterance that is the interpreter’s route to determining what it is the speaker is referring to. Corazza et al 2002 points to the importance of the *conventional aspects* of a setting of an linguistic interchange as playing a role in determining the referent of an ‘I’ token, noting that such conventions more accurately determine a referent than the producer’s intentions – e.g., Ben might write a note “I’ll be back shortly” and mistakenly attach it to Joe’s door. The intended referent of ‘I’ is Ben, but the conventionally determined referent is Joe. Perry (2005, 329-333) sketches a similar view, remarking that ‘said’ is a forensic term indicating what message a speaker is responsible for conveying, but that some degree of “commonsense” on the hearer’s part is also required to determine the speaker’s referents. Lucy O’Brien gives a plausible utterance-reflexive account of cases involving pretense, as in fiction or imagination (O’Brien 2007, 50-55). Sidelle 1991 handles such cases in terms of deferred reference. See Corazza 2004, 188-190 for a summary of Sidelle’s view.

2. The executive/interpretive distinction is not novel, but it is often treated as semantically insignificant given the popularity of “consumer” semantics so characteristic of the approach to indexicals typified by the work of Kaplan, Millikan, and others. Castañeda relies on the distinction in his 1983 reply to Perry, and subsequently, in his critique of Kaplan (Castañeda 1989b) Communication requires public meanings, and both speaker and hearer exploit those meanings in identifying what they communicate about. But indexicals requires a more subtle approach to this difference. The fact that interpretive identification follows the utterance-reflexive process while executive identification does not, is already a major difference in terms of cognitive significance and pragmatics.

3. A perspective is a combination of distinct factors into the unity of one experience from a given standpoint, a “prehensive unity” to use Whitehead’s term (1925, chp. 4). Given that the arrays of different modalities can be co-present within an interval of awareness, then distinct contemporaneous perspectives can be integrated into a more comprehensive unity. Such integration is critical for behavior that relies upon cues from one or more sensory modality, so that an agent might rely on the fact that visual *there*, say, converges with a tactile *there*. The maximally integrated perspective during any interval is the totality of immediate data co-presented in a single episode of awareness. How comprehensive it is depends on the extent of a subject’s co-awarenesses through distinct modalities. See, for example, Castañeda 1977, *passim*, and Bermudez (1998, 141) who, citing Ayers 1991, claims that “our perception of the world is cross-modal.”

4. Each executive concept imposes constraints upon what can be singled out, and a theory of a particular type, say, *you*, should articulate these constraints. While most concern spatial and temporal relations between identifier and identified, as with (6), others deal with intrinsic sortals, e.g., only events or intervals can be *then*, and only a male can be a *he*. Constraints are vague for deictic uses of the pronouns like *he*, *she*, or *it* and the demonstratives *that*, *those*, *beyond*, etc. Perhaps nothing more than location distinct from the point of origin is imposed, though the *this/that*, *these/those*, and *here/then* contrasts suggest that relative proximity is also a factor. Similarly, in non-demonstrative uses of *I*, *here*, and *now*, what is identified is located within a four dimensional array of space-time positions that includes the point of origin of the perspective, while *I* carries the additional constraint that the identifier is the same as the identified. The indexical *you*, on the other hand, restricts the temporal location of the identified item to times that are simultaneous with or subsequent to the identifier's temporal locus. Also, what is picked out through *you* must be something that the user believes is susceptible to communicational influence, though it need not actually *be* so susceptible. Thus, despite an executor's leeway as to which indexical form to use, once a choice is made, anarchy is not the rule.

5. Compare Whitehead 1958, 224: "My present experience is what I now am." William James was no doubt correct in that diachronic consciousness appears as a continuous "stream" even though there is a noticeable succession of individual states within it (James 1890, chp. xi). Perhaps experience is ultimately granular, as Whitehead contended, but nothing prevents us from focusing upon certain gross segments selected through our own focused self-awareness. Thus, the index of a first-person identification is a portion of the stream thick enough to be a salient comprehensive unity.

## References

- Anscombe, G. E. M. 1975. "The First Person." In S. Guttenplan, ed. *Mind and Language*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 45-64.
- Bermudez, José. 1998. *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1977. "Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and Consciousness." *Synthese* 35: 285-351
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1983. "Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference." In J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 313-328.
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1986. "Self-Profile." In J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Hector-Neri Castañeda*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 3-137.
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1989a. *Thinking, Language & Experience*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1989b. "Direct Reference, the Semantics of Thinking, and Guise Theory." In Almog *et al* eds., *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford 1989: 105-144.
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1999. *The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness*. Edited by James G. Hart and Tomis Kapitan. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.
- Corazza, Eros. 2004. *Reflecting the Mind*. Oxford University Press.
- Corazza, Eros. 1994. "Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations." *Dialectica*, 48, 307-336.
- Corazza, Eros, William Fish, and Jonathan Gorvett. 2002. "Who is I?" *Philosophical Studies* 107: 1-21.
- Filmore, Charles. 1997. *Lectures on Deixis*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
- Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel. 1998. 'Indexicals as Token-Reflexives.' *Mind* 107: 529-563.
- Kapitan, Tomis. 1998. "Vision, Vector, and Veracity." In Tilman Borsche et al, eds., *Blick und Bild*. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag: 31-44.
- Kapitan, Tomis. 2001. "Indexical identification: a perspectival account." *Philosophical Psychology* 14, 3: 293-312.
- Kapitan, Tomis. 2006. "Indexicality and Self-Awareness," in *Consciousness and Self Reference*, Uriah Kriegel and Ken Williford, editors, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 379-408.
- Kaplan, David. 1989a. "Demonstratives, An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals." In Almog *et al*, eds., *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford 1989: 481-564.
- Kaplan, David. 1989b. "Afterthoughts." In Almog *et al*, eds., *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford 1989: 565-614.
- Mach, Ernst. 1959. *The Analysis of Sensations*. New York: Dover.
- Millikan, Ruth. 1993. *White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Nunberg, Geoffrey. 1993. Indexicality and Deixis. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 16, 1-43.
- O'Brien, Lucy. 2007. *Self-Knowing Agents*. Oxford University Press.
- Perry, John. 1983. "Castaneda on He and I." In J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 15-42
- Perry, John. 1997. Indexicals and Demonstratives. In B. Hale and C. Wright, eds., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Blackwell, 586-612.
- Perry, John. 2000. *The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays*. Expanded Edition. Stanford: CSLI Publications
- Perry, John. 2001. *Reference and Reflexivity*. Stanford University: CSLI Publications
- Perry, John. 2002. *Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self*. Hackett.

- Perry, John. 2005. "Using Indexicals." In M. Devitt, ed., *Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language*. Blackwell, 314-334.
- Predelli, Stefano. 1998. Utterance, Interpretation, and the Logic of Indexicals. *Mind and Language*, 13, 400-414.
- Shoemaker, Sidney. 1994. Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. In Quassim Cassam ed., *Self-Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 80-93.
- Whitehead, A. N. 1958. *Modes of Thought*. New York: Capicorn Books.
- Whitehead, A. N. 1978. *Process and Reality*. New York: The Free Press.