

## ME, MYSELF, 'I'

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Self-thoughts, that is, thoughts reported in public language with 'I', are peculiar sorts of thoughts. They contrast with thoughts reported in public language with names for the same individual in two important respects. They exhibit what I have called elsewhere (Ezcurdia 2001) the *self-knowledge* and *self-locating* features.<sup>1</sup> Firstly, they suffice for knowledge about oneself in a way that thoughts reported in public language with names for the same individual do not. And secondly, they are necessary for a subject to be motivated into action for they locate the subject for the subject whilst name thoughts do not. These are well-known features of self-thoughts. My believing (1) suffices for knowledge in a way that my believing (2) does not, and my believing (3) suffices for action in a way that my believing (4) does not, for in both cases I may be amnesiac and not remember that I am Maite:

- (1) I am thinking.
- (2) Maite is thinking.
- (3) I must leave for Hamilton now.
- (4) Maite must leave for Hamilton now.

Much ink has been spilled on what makes self-thoughts so distinctive and what accounts for such features. Some have claimed that whatever accounts for what is distinctive in self-thoughts is just the meaning of the public language 'I'. But I think this is misguided. The linguistic meaning of 'I' is relatively unproblematic: it is just the speaker or producer in a context of use. That is, its semantic rule states that an instance of 'I', or 'I' relative to a context of use, refers to the speaker or the producer of that instance or in that context. Being the speaker or the producer is certainly not something that gives us what is required for self-

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<sup>1</sup> As is well-known, Perry (1979) is famous for having noted and explained the dependence of action on indexical thought, though if my interpretation of him is correct, he seems to have shifted his position somewhat. See section 1 below.

thoughts, in particular in light of their exhibiting the self-knowledge and self-locating features. And this is no surprise for public language items have different tasks to perform from those of their mental counterparts.

One could expect then to account for what is distinctive in self-thoughts in terms of a peculiar concept that does not constitute the linguistic meaning of 'I'. This maybe a concept that the subject has of herself *as herself*, that is, which presents the subject to the subject *as herself*, whatever that mode of presentation amounts to. I shall speak of this concept of me *as myself* as the *myself*- or *self*-concept or representation.<sup>2</sup> This line of thinking tries to do justice to the Fregean claim that upon having self-thoughts one is presented to oneself in a particular and primitive way in which she is presented to no other.

However, there are others who have tried to do justice to the Fregean claim too, without supposing that there is a Fregean mode of presentation involved. These have been the the defenders of the no-mental-representation view and the Millian view. According to the former, there is no mode of presentation, concept or mental representation that corresponds to the public language 'I', that is, there is no self-concept, so when I think of myself all I have is an object, namely, me. According to the latter, although there is a mental self-representation, there is no mode of presentation mediating between that representation and what it represents. The view is essentially that there are different mental counterparts for 'I', different for each subject and each behaving as a Millian name for the subject in whose head they occur. On both these accounts, what is distinctive of my self-thoughts is not that they involve a self-concept or self-representation, the *myself* concept or representation, but rather that they latch on immediately to me, to the

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<sup>2</sup> Three points of clarification. Firstly, I use italics both for emphasis or as in the title and here to refer to concepts. Secondly, it might be preferable to use the expression 'the *myself*-concept' or 'the *myself*-representation' over 'the self-concept' or 'the self-representation' to be sensitive to Castañeda cases in which one can have a concept of oneself without recognizing it is oneself. However, for ease of exposition I shall speak of such a concept or representation in any of the four ways. And thirdly, I recognize that having a self-concept may not entail having a self-representation or vice versa, if by a self-concept we mean something that involves a non-syntactic mode of presentation, and by a representation a syntactic item in the language of thought. This difference was important in Ezcurdia 2001 for two reasons: I was arguing against a Millian view, according to which self-representations were Millian names and hence involved no non-syntactic modes of presentation; and I was favouring a mode of presentation view, according to which, even if there were a Mentalese self-representation, there had to be a non-syntactic mode of presentation. Since I am assuming here that my arguments against the Millian hold, the self-representation or *myself*-representation, will involve a *myself* concept. And any *myself* concept will involve a representation, if certain views about the functioning of the mind are correct.

individual who is the subject of action or belief either due to the Millian mental name or to some contextual features of the belief-states involved. Mellor (1988) is a clear defender of the no-representation view and Millikan 1990 paper defends the Millian view.

I have argued against both these accounts elsewhere (Ezcurdia 2001), but these are extreme views. There are more moderate views such as the one defended by Perry (1986, 1990) and Millikan's 2001 paper. Perry adopts a no-representation view for what he calls primary beliefs, though not for all kinds of beliefs or other mental states. And Millikan 2001 seems to hold a mixture of a Millian and a no-representation view. For her, at least in the case of intentions and expectations about one's future, there is no need for a representation of oneself.<sup>3</sup>

My aim in this paper is to consider and argue against the moderate no-representation views of Perry and Millikan, and to examine their motivation. In the first section, I consider whether Perry is right in claiming that primary beliefs do not involve a *myself*-concept, and argue that if those beliefs are to figure in certain inferences as we expect them to, then we had better say that there is a self-concept in the belief. I next consider Millikan's reasons for intentions and expectations about one's future not to involve a *myself*-concept, and argue that they are not convincing. In section 3, I explain what the role of the *myself*-concept involves and claim that it has the role of coordinating different mental states and actions, in virtue of which it presents the subject a certain way. I end by presenting the connection between the public language indexical 'I' and the *myself*-concept, both of which refer to me in peculiar but different ways.

## 1. Beliefs without *myself*

In order to grasp appropriately Perry's motivation and claims, we need to look at the argument he presents for the possibility of thought that concerns an item of which there is no corresponding representation. Perry distinguishes three kinds of thoughts or beliefs one can have about the weather in a certain place:

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<sup>3</sup> In Ezcurdia 2001, I thought that the arguments I offered against Mellor's view could with little adjustment be offered against Perry's more moderate account. Whilst I still think that the arguments I offered there against a Millian view are right, I now think that Perry's more moderate account cannot be dealt so straightforwardly with the arguments I offered against Mellor.

primary beliefs, indexical beliefs and context-insensitive beliefs. Examples of these are beliefs whose contents are *best* expressed in public language in terms of (5), (6) and (7), respectively.

(5) It is raining.

(6) It is raining here.

(7) It is raining in Hamilton.

Looking at the propositions expressed by utterances of these sentences will help explain the difference in the corresponding beliefs. (7) is a context-insensitive sentence<sup>4</sup> insofar as anyone who utters it, no matter where they are, will be saying of Hamilton that it is raining there. (5) and (6), in contrast, are context-dependent. (6) contains the indexical 'here' which requires that a place in the context be identified as the place in which it is raining. (5) is context-dependent in a different way. It is the whole statement or sentence, and not a single constituent of it, which requires that a place be identified. For there is no morpheme or syntactical item in (5) which refers to a place, and yet any ordinary speaker of English knows that if it is raining, it is doing so somewhere for rain does not occur *simpliciter* but rather it occurs somewhere. According to Perry (1986), we can explain the truth-conditions of utterances or statements made with (5) in either of two ways: either by supposing that context supplies a propositional constituent, viz. the place, or by supposing that (5) expresses a propositional function which is true relative to a place. In the first case, we shall say that (5) expresses a proposition and is *about* a place, a place which is a constituent of the proposition, just as we would say of (6) and (7). However, on the second explanation, we are to say that (5) expresses a propositional function and *concerns* a place. In either case, when uttered at place p (5) will be true if and only if it is raining at the time of utterance at p by predicating truth *simpliciter* on the former explanation and truth relative to a place on the latter.

Perry argues that we should favour the second explanation of the content of an utterance of (5) when they are the results of our *primary* beliefs concerning rain, for it accords better with our behaviour and the way our corresponding beliefs play the role they do in bringing about appropriate actions. Beliefs, in general, have a role in coordinating information gathered perceptually and otherwise to

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<sup>4</sup> I am ignoring issues of tense throughout.

bring about the satisfaction of desires. For Perry, primary beliefs concerning rain have a certain immediate role in coordinating perception and action, and to fulfil this role it is unnecessary that they contain representations of the place where the believer is. There is a guarantee external to the belief that the information gathered perceptually and the action to be performed concern that place:

In those parts of life where there is an external guarantee that the weather information we receive be about and our actions will concern our own locale, there is no reason for our beliefs to play the internal coordinating role they need to play at other times. When I look outside and see rain and grab an umbrella or go back to bed, a relatively true belief, concerning my present surroundings, will do as well as a more articulated one, about my present surroundings. (Perry 1986, p. 180)

An internal “indexical” component of weather beliefs which makes them *about* the weather where in one’s locale, is not necessary to understand beliefs with the causal role we have envisaged, intervening between local observations and actions appropriate to local conditions. It suffices that one’s belief *concern* local weather. (Perry 1986, p. 181-2)

In contrast, there does seem to be a need for a representation of the place in question when Paul is speaking on the phone to someone in Mexico and turns to me and says (5). In that situation, there is no external guarantee that the information I receive and the actions I perform be about or concern the same place. My belief will only be able to coordinate the information gathered through perception and action if I have a representation in thought about the place (or if there is a propositional constituent in the content of the belief for the place). It would have to be explicitly there to avoid confusion, and so for my belief to successfully guide my actions.

Primary beliefs of the weather concern the local weather, and they are typically caused by observations of local weather and typically lead to appropriate action in appropriate conditions.<sup>5</sup> They are beliefs whose contents are propositional functions and which are true relative to a parameter for a place. Context-insensitive beliefs about the weather can be formed through other means, such as

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<sup>5</sup> Appropriate behaviour to beliefs best reported with (5) might be to pick up an umbrella or to utter either (5) or (6) when seeing rain. So the fact that someone utters (6) instead of (5) is no evidence that her belief is about a place rather than merely concerning a place. This does not run against our using (5)-(7) to characterize different kinds of beliefs for we have said that these sentences, or their utterances, are what *best* reported those beliefs, not that these are the only sentences a speaker may use to report the corresponding beliefs.

listening or reading weather reports. Indexical beliefs about the weather best reported by (6) have a role to play which primary beliefs do not. They help to coordinate information about the weather in various places and to communicate facts about local weather to others who are elsewhere. An indexical belief state corresponding to (6) is best conceived, according to Perry:

[...] as one that can be nomically tied to beliefs concerning the local weather and nonnominally tied, via beliefs about one's location, to beliefs about local weather. I hear on the radio "It is raining in Palo Alto". I believe it is raining here, for I know that I am in Palo Alto. As a result I believe that it is raining, a belief at a more primitive level that concerns Palo Alto. As a result, I get my umbrella. (Perry, 1986, p. 182)

Besides indexical, primary and context-insensitive beliefs, there are other beliefs which allow for information flow between these different types of beliefs. These are *identificatory* beliefs, which we may report in public language with indexical sentences like "This place is Hamilton". Because there is a need for such information flow, the claim is that representations (or propositional constituents) for the place are necessary in our cognitive life. I can infer a (7)-belief from a (4)-belief if I have the identificatory belief that this place is Hamilton.

Now, Perry argues that the most basic kind of self-knowledge or self-belief is like the primary belief about rain. It is a belief in a propositional function which is true relative to the believer. According to him, there is no need for these beliefs to involve a concept or representation of oneself in order to serve the function they have in coordinating information gathered in the environment with appropriate action. For in such cases, he claims, there is a guarantee external to the belief that the belief and action are of or concern the same individual.

When a ball comes at me, I duck; when a milk shake is put in front of me, I advance. The eyes that see and the torso or legs that move are parts of the same more or less integrated body. And this fact, external to the belief, supplies the needed coordination. (Perry 1986, p. 182)

The guarantee is given by the way our bodies are integrated, by the "architectural relations" between eyes and limbs (Perry 1990, pp. 12-3); and it is such that it becomes unnecessary to require the beliefs to have a representation (or a propositional constituent) of the subjects the beliefs concern in order to keep track of them. He claims that when there is a more or less direct way in which a perception causes an action, it is not necessary to postulate a self-representation that tracks the subject in the mediating belief that coordinates the perception and

the action. These beliefs are ones which are immediately caused by perception and cause action more or less directly.<sup>6</sup> A self-representation will, however, be needed for identifying beliefs, beliefs that allow for the transmission of information amongst context-insensitive and primary beliefs. These involve the subject's recognition or identification of himself as in Castañeda cases. An example is one in which I realize that I am that woman in the mirror, the reflection of which I had confused for another person. A famous case presented by Ernst Mach is the following:

Not long ago, after a trying railway journey by night, when I was very tired, I got into an omnibus, just as another man appeared at the other end. 'What a shabby pedagogue that is, that has just entered,' thought I. It was myself: opposite me hung a large mirror. The physiognomy of my class, accordingly, was better known to me than my own. (Mach 1886/1914, p. 4n.)

Mach's realisation of who was the shabby pedagogue requires him to have an identificatory belief to the effect that he himself is the shabby pedagogue. And for this belief a self-representation is necessary.

Two points are worth making here. Firstly, on Perry's account of indexical beliefs about the weather, they are or can be tied nomically to primary beliefs concerning the weather which themselves give rise to action. In his example an indexical rain-belief gives rise to a primary rain-belief, which in turn gives rise to action.<sup>7</sup> But why do indexical beliefs need such mediation between themselves and action? It seems that an indexical belief has all that is necessary to lead to action, for it presents the local place as the place I am at, and so no further cognitive state seems to be necessary for the appropriate intention, if not action, to be caused. This is certainly a puzzling feature in Perry's account for it is unclear why indexical beliefs would not suffice. Perry does mention in a later paper (Perry 1997) a reason for this need having to do with what he calls agent-relative roles, which we shall examine (and reject) towards the end of this section. Secondly, if the alleged nomic tie between indexical beliefs and primary beliefs were to hold, then in the case of self-beliefs, we would have to say that primary beliefs concerning myself do not

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<sup>6</sup> I take it that primary beliefs are characterized in terms of their content, and not in terms of how close they are to action. They are beliefs that have as their content propositional functions, but which also, and because of this, are close to action in the causal chain that leads to it, and if not, then to the immediate psychological causal antecedents of action.

<sup>7</sup> One can envisage such nomic tie as one that goes from primary beliefs to corresponding indexical beliefs. But this is not how Perry thinks of the nomic tie in the quote above for his example suggests it holds the other way around. More on the nomic tie in footnote 9 below.

occur only when action is caused more or less directly by perception but in all cases in which intentional action is caused. But this is too cognitively expensive for the mind for it duplicates cognitive states unnecessarily when indexical beliefs suffice. Why they suffice has to do with the role of the self-representation which we shall examine in section 3 below.

Consider now a primary belief reported with (5), and say it is Justine's. How is it that, on Perry's account, from her own perspective, Justine is *warranted* and adequately *motivated* to infer the belief that it is raining somewhere? More generally, how can subjects, from their own perspective, be warranted and motivated to infer existential beliefs from primary beliefs? The question here concerns not only what epistemically warrants or justifies a subject in making those inferences, but what motivates her, what gives her reasons to make such inferences. And, most importantly, what is being asked is what makes it the case from her own perspective and not from the perspective of the theorist. As theorists we are certainly warranted in making the inference from it is raining to it is raining somewhere for we know that (5) is true relative to a place. But can this knowledge be attributed to Justine on the present view?

Take Perry's own example of Z-landers, an example that motivates him into thinking that there are beliefs about propositional functions that concern places. Inhabitants of Z-land never travel, never obtain information about other places, have no name for their beloved Z-land, and report weather conditions, in particular, rain conditions, just by uttering (5). How can Z-landers infer that it is raining somewhere from their believing that it is raining? It seems that they cannot, for they never predicate rain of any place explicitly and do not consider other places when thinking of weather conditions. A Z-land semanticist who is doing the semantics for Z-language would take 'to rain' and the concept *rain* as denoting or being a property of times and not a two-place relation between times and places as we do, for he has no concept of other places it might rain. The way in which the Z-land semanticist does the semantics of Z-language gives us an insight into the perspective of Z-landers, that is, into how Z-landers conceive the world. For them, the inference from it is raining to it is raining somewhere is unmotivated insofar as they would have no reason to form the belief that it is raining somewhere from their belief that it is raining. Furthermore, if they made such

inferences, they would not be justified in doing so for they do not recognize that rain is a property of places. To claim that they are justified is like claiming that a subject of the 4<sup>th</sup> Century AD was justified in forming the belief that water is H<sub>2</sub>O, though no periodic table or corresponding chemical composition theory is known or available to him. In a similar fashion, if we are to explain what justifies and motivates Justine's inferred existential *rain*-belief from her primary *rain*-belief concerning a place, we must do so from her own perspective, that is, respecting the way that she conceives the world.

Although Z-landers cannot be motivated to make or be justified in making inferences to existential beliefs from their *rain*-beliefs, we can. The question is how we can do so, more particularly, how can Justine do so, if our beliefs and hers merely concern a place and are not about them? Perhaps the suggestion would be that for our primary beliefs to allow for such inferences and motivate us into making such inferences, we would need them first to generate indexical beliefs about a place, from which we could then infer an existential belief about a place. It is clear that this line of reasoning does not help for the question would now be: what gives the believer a reason and justifies him in inferring an indexical belief from a primary belief, a belief in a proposition from a belief in a propositional function?

In the case of discourse, this is effected by the external guarantee of which a speaker and hearer become aware. But although the external guarantee of which Perry speaks is easy to spot by the speaker and hearer for the case of utterances of (5) which are parts of discourse, this is not so easy in the case of beliefs. With utterances, observation of an utterance of (5) which lacks a phonetic element for a place, the discourse or environment of which (5) is an uttered part together with knowledge of the meaning of 'to rain' should suffice for the hearer and speaker (who are not Z-landers) to work out what the needed parameter is. But this is not the same in the case of beliefs. No amount of introspection will allow us to see that the thought or the representation of the thought is a propositional function, so that we are triggered into looking for the missing element. Only theoretical reasons can be given for the case that thoughts like those best reported with (5) have no representation for an element relevant to their truth-conditions.

Perry may want to argue that perhaps we are not only actually unaware but are never conscious of this inferential process, though it is a process that takes place at the doxastic level amongst beliefs. Let us grant this for the sake of argument. He may further argue that what justifies us or motivates us, and Justine, into making an inference to an existential belief has to do with our *rain* concept, which requires two elements, a place and a time. It would be her knowledge of what that concept involves what would trigger, together with her belief, the inference to an existential belief about a place. That would justify and, even motivate, the inference to the belief that it is raining somewhere from the primary belief that it is raining. This is certainly a possible explanation of what we are asking. The issue is whether this explanation generalizes for all cases of primary beliefs justifying and motivating existential beliefs. I think not. Say the concept in question is ambiguous. I claim that in those cases we cannot account for the wanted inferential potential of certain beliefs.

Consider a primary belief concerning a place best reported with (8), and which gives rise immediately to the action of putting on a coat from my perception of the local temperature through a window.

(8) It is cold.

Suppose now that I infer (via an indexical belief, if you like) the existential belief that it is cold *somewhere*. Why does my belief have the inferential potential to infer that belief and not an existential belief about *someone* being cold? Ex hypothesi, it has that inferential potential, but we need an explanation of why this is so, more particularly of why a believer should take the primary belief about being cold to concern a place and not, say, herself. On Perry's account, there is an external guarantee for both, for I and the place, and both I and a place can be cold, so the concept *being cold* cannot help us determine that the inference should be an existential belief about places and not about people, as it does in the *rain* case. Given this, the believer's merely having a primary belief and an external guarantee attached to such belief of the sort envisaged by Perry cannot motivate or justify the believer's inference to an existential belief about a place or to an indexical belief about it, namely, that it is cold somewhere or that it is cold here.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, it

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<sup>8</sup> My argument against Mellor also involves the inability to determine what the belief concerns. See Ezcurdia 2001.

cannot account for why it is that on occasions beliefs whose content consists of the propositional function being cold have the inferential potential to beliefs that it is cold somewhere and, on other occasions, to beliefs that someone is cold.<sup>9</sup> If this cannot be done, then we have not accounted for the inferential potential of the alleged primary *cold*-beliefs concerning myself and the alleged primary *cold*-beliefs concerning places, and have thus not shown how an individual can be motivated and justified in making the inferences that she makes. Consequently, Perry's general theoretical reasons for saying that there are beliefs which have as their contents propositional functions and which concern certain entities do not suffice so long as the possibility of certain motivated and justified inferences need to be explained.<sup>10</sup> The case of *rain*-beliefs did not seem to require that the subject have a representation of the place in order to account for the motivation and justification of the believer, but *cold*-beliefs do seem to require this, both for the case of places as for the case that matters to us here, namely, that of subjects.

Analogous considerations to the ones we have been developing apply directly to other self-beliefs, and not only in cases in which I attribute temperature to myself. Presumably, I can infer from the alleged primary belief concerning me that a ball is coming, the belief about me that a ball is coming *at me* or that a ball is going *towards someone*. But how am I motivated and justified in making such an inference? A ball can be coming towards a place, a place big enough that I occupy part of it, and not necessarily be coming towards me.<sup>11</sup> If this is so, then why is it that the inferential potential of the belief in question is to indexical and existential beliefs concerning people and not places? Not only am I able to make inferences

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<sup>9</sup> One option would be to claim that there is a nomic causal tie between a primary belief and an indexical belief, such that every time one has a primary belief one generates an indexical belief. But notice that this does not resolve why it is that beliefs, whose content is the propositional function of *being cold*, is nomically tied on certain occasions to indexical beliefs about myself and on others to indexical beliefs about places. Furthermore, if it was possible to resolve the inferential potential of a primary *rain*-belief without needing to resort to brute or blind nomic causal ties, then it would be *ad hoc* to seek for an explanation in these cases in terms of such blind causal nomological links.

<sup>10</sup> Perry seems to be partly, though not wholly, sensitive to the problem I am pointing out here:

We need a reference to the believer to specify the conditions under which the belief is true.

Without this [...] we will not be able to understand the logical connections between thought concerning an object and thought about an object. (Perry 1993, p. 184).

But Perry is only sensitive of the logical connections which a theorist is able to detect and not ones which guide the thinker.

<sup>11</sup> Suppose I am sitting watching a rugby match and a ball is kicked over the posts and I am standing in the general region behind the posts but not in the exact direction of the ball. Then the ball can be said to be coming towards a place, a region of which I occupy, but not towards me.

from alleged primary beliefs to existential beliefs, but my having the alleged primary beliefs should provide me with good motivation to make such inferences and should justify my doing so. Again, on Perry's account, there is nothing in the subject that would allow for these inferences, that would show how the subject is justified in making these inferences from her own point of view or even why such beliefs would ever motivate her into making such inferences.

What the alleged primary *cold*-beliefs have taught us is that one cannot claim that there is no self-representation just because there is an almost immediate coordination between perception and action if that coordination is effected by a belief. For as long as the mediating belief could, through memory or other factors, feature in inferences to indexical or existential beliefs, the representation is needed.<sup>12</sup>

Perry seems to be moved into his view by what happens in the perceptual case. In perception, I acquire information about objects in relation to me, for example, information as to how far and in what direction they lie. However, the perceptual state does not represent me, though it represents relations which objects have with respect to me; and, arguably, the perceptual content does not have me as its constituent.<sup>13</sup> Take the case of visual perception, no element of me is in the field of vision or a component of the content of my visual experience. In the case of

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<sup>12</sup> Perry could, of course, hold that there is no need for a self-representation whilst arguing that the content of the belief is a full propositional content. It is not clear that my arguments here would apply. But in that case, the arguments I level against Millikan in the next section about cognitive mechanisms and economy would apply. And he sometimes speaks as though this is what he has in mind:

It seemed to me that the selfless thoughts were closely tied to perception and action and might be the only sorts of thoughts which animals and small children and adults in certain situations need to have. So, I wanted to be able to say, in a way I thought I could understand, that the person having the thought is an unarticulated constituent of the first kind of thought and that the steps of self-introduction and self-elimination preserves the content but changes the form of the thought. (Perry 2007, p. 538)

However, in his postscript or afterword to the 1986 paper, he suggests that "in cases in which same unrepresented parameter is relevant to a whole mode of thinking [...], we should classify each specific belief or utterance with a propositional function" (1993a, p. 185). In cases in which there is no such parameter relevant to a whole mode of thought, it would seem that Perry could accept that the mental state in question have as its content a full proposition, one of whose constituents is unarticulated or unrepresented or unconceptualized by that state. But, on his view, these states could not be primary beliefs of rain or the self for these need not represent, or be about, the place or the self in order to perform their coordinating role between perception and action. The states in question would then have to be non-primary beliefs (or other non-primary states).

<sup>13</sup> Searle (1983) equates a percept's content with satisfaction or truth-conditions, and by so doing he is obliged to take the perceiver as part of the perceptual content, as well as causal relations between the objects perceived and the perceiver. But this view is phenomenologically implausible.

perception, I am very much aware of its components and can through some reflection of my own perception identify such components. We can determine the components of perceptual content by reflection on what the experience is like for us, but independently of theoretical reasons. True, I may not be able to determine whether I am perceiving a sense-datum or the object and properties in the world themselves, but I should be able to figure out from a first person perspective whether in the content of my visual experience there is an object that looks like an apple or not. The case of belief is not accessible to consciousness in the same way if Perry is right.

Now, the fact that perception gives rise to beliefs which, I claim, do have a representation of myself should not concern us beyond the concern we have about how it is that information in the percept is picked up by the belief and the nature of the concepts we use in thinking about the information thus received. I do not claim that this is not a significant philosophical question, but it is not one that should concern us here, for the way in which we extract conceptual information from perception whether it is about the concepts we use in thinking about the objects we perceive, or about the distance between two perceived object objects or about the relation those objects have to me, will all require a similar answer.<sup>14</sup>

If, as it probably occurs, there are instances in which coordination between perception and action do not to require a mediating and coordinating belief, then there truly would be no need for a self-concept or self-representation to figure as part of the content of a mental state, for it will not be needed for the sake of the perceptual content. In cases of reflexes or instinctive actions, there is no belief or intention mediating the percept and the action. Such cases consist in behaviour which is voluntary insofar as it can come under the control of the believer but which is more a matter of a reflex or instinct. Perry's example of ducking when the ball is coming at one is a case in point.

But Perry does not think that only in cases of reflex behaviour we do not need a self-representation. He (1990, 1998) speaks of a certain kind of self-

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<sup>14</sup> Perceptual content (at least scenario-type content) is essentially perspectival and egocentric, that is, things are presented from a particular point, so distances and size, for example, are always represented from a particular point, though that point itself is not represented. Obtaining a belief about myself from a perception of objects will require that the cognitive systems pay heed to the point from which the objects in perception are presented. I suggest two ways of doing so below.

knowledge that does not require one have a self-representation but which concerns the subject. This is agent-relative knowledge of objects, where knowledge of objects obtains through certain agent-relative roles they hold. I know what role my computer has with respect to me as I sit here in front of it in a way that enables me to act accordingly, say, type on it. There is an epistemic method connected to the role the object has to me: the way to find out about an object in front of one is to touch it or look at it. And there is a pragmatic method connected to it as well: we know how to perform different operations on them: we type on the computer, move it from where it is, etc. These sorts of knowledge are essential to acting upon the objects around us:

When we perceive how the world is around us and act upon it, we need to judge what distance and direction things stand relative to ourselves. But we do not need to keep track of who it is that we are judging things to be in front of or to the left of, at least as long as we are basing our actions on simple perceptual knowledge. In this case, our knowledge concerns ourselves but need not involve an explicit representation of ourselves. (Perry, 1998, p. 329)

I agree with Perry that upon acting with respect to objects around us we need to know the relations they stand to us, and that knowing this enables us to act with respect to them in certain ways. But what I don't agree with is that this sort of knowledge is something that is found at the level of thought or belief. The knowledge in question strikes me quite clearly as a knowledge that stays at the level of perception and which, together with proprioceptive information about where my limbs are, guides my actions with respect to the computer. The distance, the size, the shape of things, do not need to be conceptualized or believed to be a certain way for me to act with respect to them, though that information needs to be stored within me if I am to move my limbs appropriately. True, I can say (9) or (10) to report beliefs that take into account the agent-relative roles which the computer bears to me, and these are reports in which I am not explicitly represented. But this does not show that the nature of the corresponding beliefs is the same.

(9) That is a computer.

(10) There is a computer over there.

It is not my aim here to give an account of demonstrative thought. Much has been written on it and it would take us further afield than the space I have for it now. But let me say the following. Firstly, the fact that a belief best reported with (9) and

(10) require that the computer stands in a certain relation to me does not show that this relation is part of its truth-conditions, rather than the enabling conditions for me to have that singular belief or thought about it. That is, the fact that the computer stands in a certain relation to me via perception allows me to have singular thoughts about it; but these singular beliefs need not incorporate the relation they bear to me. Secondly, even if such beliefs were to involve a relation to me, the form of the corresponding reports is not to be taken to show directly what is articulated in the thought and what is not articulated in it. The argument I have been developing in this section has emphasised this point. If I am right, then our need to account for the inferential potential of beliefs requires that we do posit such self-representation. Whether demonstrative beliefs expressed by utterances of (9) and (10) in our example also require that one posit a self-representation to explain their inferential potential is an open question. If they do, then they will involve a self-representation. If they do not, then they will be singular thoughts about objects and the relations I hold towards them will only be belief-enabling. In any event, the claim that we need to posit beliefs that concern the subject to explain how it is that we can act with respect to perceived objects around us is I think unfounded. That there is knowledge of the roles they have to us does not show that this is captured at the doxastic level. The knowledge involved might be better described as a knowing which, that is, as discriminating knowledge of the object in an egocentric space, and a know how, that is, as practical knowledge of how to act with respect to it given information about size, shape, distance, etc., which perception provides.

## **2. Intentions and coordination**

Millikan argued in 1990 that self-thoughts do involve self-representations but that these are Millian self-names. However, in her 2001 revised paper she shifted her position and suggested that, at least for the case of intentions and expectations about one's future, a subject need not have a representation of herself. The absence of such a need is based on considerations similar to Perry's for primary beliefs. I

shall focus here on the case of intentions since considerations against them should apply *mutatis mutandis* to other expectations about one's future.<sup>15</sup>

Intentions, for Millikan, are what she calls *pushmi-pullyu representations*: they state or describe *and* direct or guide at the same time (Millikan 1995). In this, they differ from beliefs and desires. On her account, a desire is a directive representation insofar as its proper function, that is, the function desires perform that have aided in their survival and proliferation, is to guide the mechanisms using it to produce their satisfaction conditions. A descriptive representation like a belief is not descriptive, on this view, because of its function. The satisfaction conditions of a descriptive representation, that is, its truth-conditions, are rather those to which the representation adapts its interpreters (users or consumers) in the service of their own proper functions. Take the (7)-belief (*i.e.* the belief best reported in public language with (7)). Its truth-conditions, namely, that it is raining in Hamilton at time *t*, is a condition that must obtain if the relevant interpreter's (proper) way of being guided by the representation is to fulfil that interpreter's proper functions according to evolutionary design. In the case of beliefs, the relevant interpreter is a decision-making and action guiding mechanism in the believer. My belief that it is raining in Hamilton can guide my decision-making and action-guiding mechanism such that it serves its function in aiding the fulfilment of my desires only if it is raining in Hamilton. If I desire not to get wet, I may avoid going to Hamilton on the basis of this belief and other beliefs and desires. Furthermore, if the belief that it is raining in Hamilton is to help my decision-making mechanism make a correct inference concerning whether the weather report was accurate, it needs to be raining in Hamilton.

For Millikan intentions are directive because in giving rise to the intended actions, they perform their proper functions, and they are descriptive because someone cannot sincerely intend to do something without believing she will do it.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> In fact, if what I say about intentions is correct, then the situation with expectations about the future would be worse off for they interact in complex ways with beliefs, ways that may be more complex than the way intentions interact with them. For example, an expectation about the future that arises from a decision-making process that is carried out in a considered manner will interact with beliefs and desires in complex ways. As we shall see below, it is this interaction with beliefs and desires in practical reasoning that will provide us with reason to doubt that intentions do not need a self-representation or a self-concept.

<sup>16</sup> That they are descriptive and directive is not to say that they are best understood as being the conjunction of a belief or a desire for, according to Millikan, they are supposed to be evolutionarily

She further claims that intentions have this nature not as a matter of conceptual necessity but of neurological and evolutionary economy:

Suppose that my brain already harbors, for purposes of guiding my action, a representation of what I am definitely going to do. And suppose there is need to take this settled future into account when making further decisions about what else I can compatibly do. It would surely waste space and introduce unnecessary mechanisms for evolution to duplicate the representation I already have. Better just to use it over again as a descriptive representation as well. (Millikan 1995, p. 192)

Be that as it may, why is it that intentions do not require a self-representation or self-concept? Millikan gives two reasons. The first reason is that in soliloquy there is no explicit reference to the self as in (11), or even when we are trying to direct someone else's intentions as with (12).

(11) And now to bed.

(12) Close the door.

But this is not convincing. Soliloquies are made up of the production of public language items, be they when one is speaking out loud or thinking the words. So the rules that govern such items should be used in the interpretation of their instances or utterances. Notice that (11) (at least) can be used either in soliloquies or to direct someone's intentions; it can be used as a verbal expressions of an intention or as a request to others to act in certain ways. A difference between these uses may be explained in terms of the pragmatics of the utterances or in terms of hidden syntactical elements in the deeper structure of each utterance which specify whether the subject is 'you' or 'I'. Whatever the explanation we give of utterances of these sentences, it is clear that it is not something we can straightforwardly apply to thought. The lessons from the previous section about the divergence between thought and language should have taught us as much.

The second reason Millikan gives is more challenging. Intentions are not *designed* to guide anyone else's actions but the subject in which they occur and so, she thinks, they do not need a self-representation to elicit the action in the appropriate agent, in the same way in which there is no need for a self-

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more primitive than them. This is why she prefers to say that they are undifferentiated between being directive and being descriptive. Intentions are, on her view, just instances of other pushmi-pullyu representations in nature (outer rather than inner representations, mind you). An example is the tail splash of a beaver which tells there is danger and also tells other beavers to dive under. Unlike the latter, however, the descriptive and directive content of intentions is the same.

representation in the case of a visual percept that provides information about the distance and location of objects from the subject. We have already seen how it is that percepts differ from beliefs, where the beliefs' tasks or roles demand that it involve a self-concept or self-representation. The question is whether intentions are more like percepts or more like beliefs in the relevant respects.

It is interesting that the states Millikan considers do not require *myself*-representations are precisely the counterparts of primary beliefs in the input-output schema. Primary beliefs were beliefs immediately produced by perception (though they also more or less immediately cause behaviour), whilst intentions are the immediate causal antecedents of actions. However, just as beliefs can give rise to inferences, intentions have other psychological roles besides guiding actions, they are the result of practical reasoning, reasoning in virtue of which they are able to guide actions. Such reasoning involves beliefs, desires and perhaps other states in which a self-representation is present. For example, my belief that if I don't want to catch the flu this year I had better have a vaccination, coupled with my desire not to fall ill this year, cause and are reasons for my intention to have a vaccination.<sup>17</sup> Both the belief and the desire in this reasoning involve a self-representation, and they not only cause the intention in question as a matter of brute or blind causation. Rather the contents of the belief and desire are relevant for the content of the intention. How they are relevant is certainly something that has preoccupied others, giving some a reason for hypothesizing the existence of a language of thought. In order to explain how it is that the propositional content of a mental state is relevant in causing the content of another mental state, Fodor (1975) proposed that what mattered for such causation were the language of thought representations or sentences which had syntactic and semantic properties. These representations express a propositional content partly in virtue of their syntactic arrangement. Furthermore, they are entities which have physical shape-like properties and which, therefore, are able to be involved in efficient causation.

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<sup>17</sup> Notice that not only the content of intentions but also that of desires is reported without the use of an explicit subject. However, no moderate no-representationist has claimed that desires do not involve a self-concept or self-representation. This shows how we should be careful in trying to learn too much about mental states from their linguistic expressions. My bet is that syntactic analyses of reports of desires and intentions will show traces of pronouns at the level of Logical Form.

Whether the language of thought hypothesis is correct is not at issue here, but it is a useful tool to explain what is at issue.

What is at issue is why, if two states whose representational structure or sentences in Mentalese include a self-representation, the state that they cause and whose content they influence does not? Millikan's reply is that because of what intentions are designed to do, namely, to guide actions of the subject to which they belong and no other, there is no need for such a representation. On her view, the content of the intention is a full propositional content, one of whose constituents is mentally unarticulated and is the agent who has the intention. Millikan does not put it explicitly this way, but I think this is what she has in mind. She gives as examples the bee's dance and visual percepts. Both *show* things relative to certain parameters (relative to hive and sun or relative to the position of the perceiver), but they do not include a representation of this parameter. So, if we were to specify the truth-conditions of these representations (or icons), as well as the intentions, the parameters and the subject would figure in them though there would not be a part of the representation (or icons) that would represent them.<sup>18</sup>

What makes my practical reasoning to the concluded intention, namely, to have a flu vaccination, a sound form of reasoning is the content of the state; so there is no problem in explaining this on Millikan's account for the content of the intention is fully propositional. What is not clear on her account, however, is how the psychological mechanisms which are designed to produce intentions through practical reasoning, and to produce them in ways which yield sound or correct forms of reasoning, are to achieve their goals if intentions do not involve a self-representation.

Recall that intentions are descriptive like beliefs. We would expect that a belief which arises as a result of an inferential process involving beliefs with self-representations will itself also involve a self-representation. If inferred intentions were to be different from inferred beliefs insofar as containing an incomplete Mentalese sentence rather than a complete one, this would be surprising. In fact, an explanation would have to be given of why these forms of reasoning would

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<sup>18</sup> See Millikan 2001, p. 175. The arguments I give below with small adjustments would apply also to a version of Millikan's view on which the content is a propositional function and the representation is made true relative to a parameter.

count as sound forms of reasoning from the perspective of the subject, more particularly, from the perspective of that subject's cognitive or practical mechanisms that had the intention as an output.

There is no argument, certainly, from neurological or cognitive economy in the offing for the view that inferred intentions have non-fully articulated representations or incomplete Mentalese sentences. The mechanisms that produce beliefs with self-representations could be exactly the same as those that produce intentions with self-representations. There would have to be differences, of course, in the way that such mechanisms operate for at times they give rise to intentions and at other times beliefs, but nothing compels us to think that it would be neurologically or cognitively more expensive to have the outputs of practical reasoning have a full propositional content or a full Mentalese sentence. In fact, as we shall soon see, Millikan's own proposal will turn out to be cognitively more expensive.

As we have said, Millikan's main reason for the disanalogy between beliefs and intentions concern what the latter are designed to do. On her view, intentions are designed to guide action. But saying this without some spelling out, leaves some important detail out. Intentions may immediately guide actions or they may themselves, at least in humans, be the inputs to further practical reasoning that eventually leads to action. Moreover, intentions are themselves the outcomes of practical reasoning. So, where questions of design are relevant, we would say that practical reasoning mechanisms in humans that have evolved are such that they must allow not only for the production of intentions but also to receive intentions as inputs. Thus, we need to pay attention both to how those practical reasoning mechanisms yield their outputs and what sort of outputs these need to be in order for the mechanisms to perform their functions successfully, and to how such outputs could themselves be used by the practical reasoning mechanisms.

Intentions in humans are states that guide action, but they are also the outcomes or reasoning such that their truth or satisfaction conditions are meant to be related in *appropriate* and *accurate* ways with the states that cause them, states that serve to reason for it. (The issue of appropriateness has to do with the intention being related to the right sort of mental states, say beliefs and desires; whilst the issue of accuracy has to do with the nature of the contents of those

states.) The fact that intentions are thus related to other mental states explains why they have proliferated in humans just as much as their guiding actions does. For if in humans intentions were not the outcomes of practical reasoning mechanisms, either the practical reasoning mechanisms would have died out or the intentions themselves would have died out. The practical reasoning mechanisms or the intentions would have been very poor in coordinating perception with action, or beliefs and desires with action, and so they would not have proliferated.

The easiest and more economical way for a mechanism (interpreter or user) to ensure the accuracy between the contents of mental states is if the generated state by the reasoning, be it a belief or an intention, has a full propositional content whose constituents are all articulated in the mental representation. This will account for why a form of practical reasoning is sound or correct from the practical reasoning mechanism's perspective. Consider the fact that intentions may not only be guides to action but may also be involved in reasoning with other beliefs to form new intentions or change old ones. At time  $t$  I may have intended to catch the bus from Auckland to Hamilton today, but upon believing that there are road works on the motorway and my desire not to be late to the seminar, at  $t_1$  I modify my intention to the effect that I catch an early bus from Auckland to Hamilton. If intentions interact in this way with beliefs (and, as Millikan,<sup>19</sup> I see no reason for them not to), then it is better to suppose that at least as far as the way they represent their content, they do not differ radically from beliefs. After all, as Millikan herself points out, intentions, though they are directive, they are descriptive like beliefs. And if they describe in the same way as beliefs, we should expect them to be just like them. But even further, were Millikan's non-representationism right, we would need special algorithms or mechanisms that allowed for this inferential interaction between beliefs and intentions. We would need an algorithm or mechanism that gave as outputs states which had incomplete Mentalese sentences from states with complete Mentalese sentences, and an algorithm or mechanism that allowed accurate inferences from states with incomplete Mentalese sentences to states with complete Mentalese sentences. It is not that such algorithms could not be obtained. It is rather that her account would

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<sup>19</sup> See the quote from Millikan 1995 above.

be, at least, more cognitively expensive than the account which assumes that the intentions have a fully articulated content, in particular, that they have representation of the self. More to the point: it would require evolution to have selected a more complex sort mechanism than if the no-representationist view about the self for the case of intentions were wrong. And surely, in the interest of economy, we should prefer accounts that make evolution select the simpler mechanisms if the results achieved by both are the same.

In sum, if we acknowledge the role that intentions have not only in eliciting appropriate actions but in participating as outputs and inputs to practical reasoning, and we acknowledge that their having these roles is what made them proliferate in our ancestors and keeps them going in the present day, then we must give an account of them and the reasoning mechanisms that allows them to have these roles. If one of the accounts we give posits a cognitively less expensive mechanism then we should prefer it. The less expensive account is the one that assumes that intentions involve self-representations.

Let me put the point in a slightly different way. In explaining intentions and their content, we need to give an account that coordinates two proper functions: the function of the intentions and the function of the mechanisms whose function it is to give rise to them. The proper function of an intention is to guide action, but in doing so it not only guides action directly or immediately, but also in participating as inputs to practical reasoning. So, an adequate account of an intention's function needs to characterize it in a way that allows it to serve as an input to the practical reasoning mechanism. After all, such a mechanism is a consumer or user of the intention. Now, the practical reasoning mechanism's proper function is to issue intentions and these have to be of a certain sort if the mechanism is to perform its function properly, in particular, in a way that respects the relations of accuracy between beliefs and desires, on the one hand, and intentions, on the other. The cognitively least expensive mechanism that does so is most plausibly the one which has evolved. Contrary to what Millikan would like, this mechanism is just the one that treats intentions as involving a self-representation.

### 3. *Myself* and 'I'

Moderate no-representationists concede that there are mental states for which a self-representation or a self-concept is needed. For Millikan, these are most mental states except intentions (and expectations about one's future); for Perry, these include most states except primary beliefs concerning the subjects. But once it has been conceded that there is a concept of *myself*, that is, a self-representation or a self-concept, I think the game has been given up.

We have acknowledged above that part of the coordinating role between information about the world and action is effected through the information channels between perception and action directly. But where that information does not suffice for coordinating action in the appropriate way, a self-representation via a belief-desire or practical reasoning mechanism performs this task. The job or role (or proper function, if you like) of the self-representation is to coordinate different kinds of mental states of an individual that give rise to actions, where perception and proprioception will not suffice. The states in question involve desires, beliefs of all sorts, including those that are immediately caused by percepts, intentions, fears, sensations, etc. The role of the self-concept is to perform, if you like, a similar sort of job to the one Kant gave to the *I think*. I shall not attempt an exegesis of Kant here, but I take it that his aim (or one of his aims) was to say how it is that different psychological states or states of experience could be the experience of one and the same subject. To fulfil this task he required that each experience be accompanied by the *I think*, thus unifying experiences as experiences of the same subject. Something similar is the role I am attributing to the self-concept. It is a concept which has as its task that of unifying and coordinating the information provided by different sources (perception, reasoning, and so on) to bring about actions in the subject in which it occurs, and it is by virtue of fulfilling this role that it secures the subject as its referent.

The role of a self-representation or concept is to hook up with

- (i) states in a subject that provide information about the world and about her,
- (ii) desires, intentions and expectations about the future that provide information about outcomes desirable to her, and
- (iii) her dispositions to act, think and perceive of a particular subject,

in a way that allows actions to be the result of coordination between (i), (ii) and (iii) when such coordination is not effected by perception and proprioception, and such that the subject in question is one which the owner of (i)-(iii) knows how to move (to borrow an expression from Millikan), knows what it is like to be her<sup>20</sup> or is identical to her.<sup>21</sup> Upon having this role, we can say that my self-representation or self-concept presents me as a subject of thought, action and perception, whom I know how to move or of whom I know what it is like to be her.

If the *myself*-representation is to fulfil this function (proper or not), then it cannot be the case that there are intentions or primary beliefs of oneself with no representation of the self. For in that case the *myself*-representation would not be adequately coordinating those states with the rest of the mental states either in inferences to existential beliefs or in practical reasoning, both of which help coordinate different sorts of action.

When a ball is coming at me and I duck, my perception of the ball and proprioceptive information of where my body and limbs lie suffice for my ducking it. No belief, intention or other is needed for coordinating action. But, on other occasions, something else is needed. When Perry realizes that he is the person spilling the sugar around the supermarket aisles, when Mach realizes that he is the shabby man in the mirror, or when I believe that I am cold or that there is a computer in front of me, a self-representation is needed to coordinate these beliefs with other beliefs, desires and intentions, to give rise to appropriate action.

Why is it then that perceptual states do not involve a self-representation and are, nonetheless, good sources of information for action? Unlike other species and except for cases of instinctive or reflex behaviour, perceptual states alone do not generate actions in humans. In order to guide or lead to action, perception requires that the subject have proprioceptive information about herself, as well as beliefs,

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<sup>20</sup> This is essentially what I had in mind in Ezcurdia 2001 when I said (partially following Millikan (1990)) that the psychological role of the self-concept is to hook up with the dispositions to act, think and perceive, of the person whom I know how to move or of whom I know what it is like to be her (Ezcurdia 2001, p. 179 footnote 3). When I said that my self-concept presents me *as myself*, all I meant was that it presented me as a subject of thought, action and perception, whom I know how to move or of whom I know what it is like to be her, and that this was achieved through its psychological role. My claim was, and still is, that in having such a role, the self-concept ensures what its reference is, namely, me, and it is because of this that self-representations are not Millian names (against Millikan 1990). See Ezcurdia 2001, pp. 196-198.

<sup>21</sup> Both Perry (1990, 1997) and Mellor (1988) resort to the relation of identity to account for beliefs about oneself.

desires and intentions. As such, the *myself*-representation will have achieved its job of eliciting coordinated action if it coordinates beliefs, desires and intentions. There is no need for it to coordinate the information from perception or proprioception to generate appropriate intentions beyond the information contained in the belief immediately caused by the percept or, when needed, the belief about the positioning of my limbs obtained from proprioceptive information.<sup>22</sup> This is not to deny the fact that information present in perception may guide the bodily movements I exhibit when I act, given the proprioceptive information I have about the positioning of my body. When I perceive an object, I reach out and modify my grasp appropriately to grab it. Here information is transmitted non-conceptually from perception to bodily movements, given proprioceptive information. However, such coordination does not occur at the doxastic level. This being so, there is no objection in the offing from perception to the role of the *myself*-concept.

If the self-concept has the role I am envisaging here, then we can account for the self-locating and self-knowledge features of which I spoke at the outset. Remember self-beliefs suffice for knowledge and action in a way that name-beliefs do not. If the self-concept hooks up with the dispositions to act of the subject I know how to move then it cannot but locate me for myself as the subject of action, and I cannot but act according to that belief and other mental states (desires and intentions). If the self-concept hooks up with the dispositions to think of the subject I know how to move, I know what it is like to be her or with which I am identical, it exhibits a self-conscious element. It is this self-conscious element that makes it true that the upon having the belief expressed by an utterance of (2) above, namely, that I am thinking, this state constitutes knowledge, for there is a guarantee not only that there is a subject that is involved in that act of thinking, but that the believer realizes that this is the case.

Now, a proper account of the self-concept should say why it is that we use 'I' to report our self-beliefs, especially when the semantics of these differ. In the case of the self-concept, I claim that it presents and refers to a subject as herself, that is, as the subject of thought, action and perception she knows how to move or

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<sup>22</sup> Not all action requires the subject to form beliefs derived from proprioceptive information. In order to walk, I need to have proprioceptive information of where my limbs are, but I do not need to form a belief about them. I may, of course, upon attending to them, form such beliefs.

what it is like to be her. But in the case of 'I', its semantic rule says that it refers to the speaker or producer in a context. Frege was right in thinking that upon having self-thoughts I have a way of being presented to myself in which I am presented to no other. This is what happens with the *myself*-concept. However, the best I can do is present myself as the subject of thought, of perception or of action to others. It is certainly difficult to present myself as the subject of thought and perception directly to others, but it is easy to present myself as the subject of action, especially because in presenting myself I am thereby producing an action. So to others, using language, I may present myself as the agent of an utterance, that is, as the producer or speaker of a particular linguistic item. And this just corresponds to the mode of presentation involved in the semantic rule or linguistic meaning of 'I'. In so presenting myself, I have come as close as I can to communicating my self-concept.

So you might wonder: what about me? I have discussed what is involved in the *myself* concept and how it relates to 'I', and I have assumed that when occurring in me or uttered by me refer to a person, namely, me. But I have said little about the referent, about me. Certainly, discussions of the self-concept cannot be *wholly* independent of considerations about what individuates a person, but addressing issues of personal identity have more to do with the metaphysics of personhood and should not lead me to alter in any substantial way what I have said so far about *myself* and 'I'. What is true, however, is that whatever account we give of me, of the person that I am, it needs to respect the role of self-concepts and how it is that we conceive of ourselves with it, namely, as subjects of thought, perception and action, in a way that permits us to control bodily movements. Here I have limited myself to arguing in favour of such a role.

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